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Abstract 
Little is known about the mechanisms for change involved in Imagery Rescripting 
(ImRs), an image-based therapy technique used to target intrusive imagery in post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) by imaging alternative endings to traumatic events 
(Arntz, 2012). The aim of this study was to explore the role of simulation as a 
mechanism for change in ImRs through the use of a single-case experimental design 
(SCED) and coding. Both ImRs and simulation involve the mental construction of a 
hypothetical event that has not actually happened. Seven individual cases were 
followed for the duration of rescripting of one image. It was hypothesised that those 
with well-simulated rescripts would experience greater reductions in image 
intrusiveness than those with less well-simulated rescripts. Effective ImRs was also 
hypothesised to link with greater reductions in counterfactual thinking (and associated 
frequency/distress) and an increase in global meaning, with high levels of simulation 
expected to play a role in both of these links. Sessions were also coded for other 
potential mechanisms such as activation of thoughts/emotions and level of belief in the 
rescript. Coding results from session recordings and patterns of outcome measures from 
the seven cases were explored at group and individual levels. Due to the small sample 
size and the observational nature of much of the analyses, results were tentative in 
nature. However, group and individual analyses offered initial support for the idea that 
higher levels of simulation were followed by greater reductions in symptoms. 
Additional factors, especially intensity of thoughts/emotions related to original and new 
imagery elements, level of cognitive and emotional shift and belief in the resultant 
rescript, were also identified. Potential mechanisms of action between these factors are 
discussed. Offering initial support for the second hypothesis, participants who 
 
 
experienced the greatest change in symptom severity also experienced the greatest 
changes in counterfactual thinking, and very tentative support suggests that this was 
linked to simulation levels. No support was found for the third hypothesis, as symptom 
severity reduction was not linked to increases in global meaning. Potential implications 
of these findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.     
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arises from exposure to severe, life-threatening 
events and involves attempts to emotionally process both what has happened and the 
various ways in which the trauma might have been avoided or turned out differently 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Recovery is also concerned with re-establishing a sense of 
personal meaning (Horowitz, 1986). Imagery Rescripting (ImRs), a treatment approach 
that involves imagining alternative endings to traumatic events, has received much 
attention over the past few decades. There is a growing body of evidence suggesting 
that ImRs is effective in reducing PTSD symptomology (e.g., Arntz, Tiesema & Kindt, 
2007; Ehlers, Clark, Hackmann, McManus & Fennell, 2005; Grunert, Weis, Smucker 
& Christianson, 2007). 
 
However, due to its complex nature, there is little systematic research into the 
underlying mechanisms of ImRs (Arntz, 2012). One recent study developed a coding 
scheme in order to start making sense of the myriad of factors that might be related to 
change in ImRs (Salter, 2014). While this study represents an important step within 
ImRs literature, the coding scheme failed to capture (1) the detailed imaginal nature of 
scenarios constructed in ImRs, and (2) that these involve counterfactual events that have 
not actually occurred. The simulation heuristic (SH), which stipulates that the 
properties of imagined scenarios that lend them believability relate to the ease with 
which a mental model of a hypothetical situation can be created (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), encompasses both of these key aspects. The SH 
has not yet been considered as a mechanism for change in ImRs. 
 
The idea that ImRs efficacy may rely in part on its level of simulation leads to the 
consideration of two further factors: counterfactual thinking and global meaning. 
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Heightened counterfactual thinking (Davis et al., 1995), a reduction in one’s sense of 
global meaning (Park, 2010) and the associated distress have been implicated in PTSD. 
Similar to ImRs, both of these phenomena involve the mental construction of a coherent 
narrative, either about what could have happened or about one’s sense of self and the 
world. 
 
The aim of this study was to explore (1) the mechanisms through which ImRs produces 
change for people with PTSD, (2) whether the tendency to continuously generate 
distressing counterfactuals about potential alternative outcomes is in some way 
interrupted and reduced by the ImRs process and (3) whether effective ImRs relates to 
an increase in one’s sense of personal meaning. The study had a particular focus on 
simulation and how it may provide a common thread throughout these potential 
changes. 
 
PTSD and Intrusive Images 
PTSD is triggered by exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual 
violation. Symptoms include re-experiencing, avoidance, negative cognitions, low 
mood and hyper-arousal (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Re-experiencing 
involves spontaneous memories, dreams, flashbacks and prolonged psychological 
distress. Avoidance of distressing thoughts, feelings, memories and external reminders 
of the traumatic event are common. People also often experience a distorted sense of 
blame of self/others and an inability to remember key aspects of the event. 
 
‘Flashbacks’, often considered the hallmark of PTSD, are recurrent sensory images of 
past trauma (Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). They include sounds, 
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smells, tastes and/or bodily sensations (Hackmann, Ehlers, Speckens & Clark, 2004), 
although visual imagery tends to be the most common. Flashbacks can recur against a 
person’s will, with intense emotion and a sense that they are happening in the here-and-
now. They often consist of patients’ subjective worst trauma moments (‘hot spots’) 
(Holmes, Grey & Young, 2005). Intrusion triggers are not always in conscious 
awareness and can consist of reminders in the external or internal psychological 
environment (Hirsch & Holmes, 2007). Due to the aversive nature of intrusive images 
and resultant negative emotions and physiological arousal, triggers are typically 
avoided. Given the range of potential triggers, and the fact that people cannot always 
identify triggers, the level of avoidance is often extensive, with a severe impact on daily 
functioning. 
 
Summary. Intrusions have a significant impact on daily life. In addition to the 
distress associated with the inherent uncontrollable and ‘here-and-now’ nature of 
intrusions, they also drive hyperarousal and avoidance of triggers in PTSD. Due to their 
far-reaching effects, reducing intrusions is a key target for treatment. Thus, an 
understanding of how they are developed and maintained is important. In turn, this can 
shed light on appropriate treatment options as well how best to carry out these treatment 
techniques in clinical practice. 
 
Development and Maintenance of Intrusive Imagery 
Various models of development and maintenance of PTSD exist. The three main 
theories are outlined below. They are presented in chronological order. Each theory 
builds, to an extent, on that which came before. Thus, while there are differences in the 
rationale that each presents, there are also commonalities throughout. 
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Emotional Processing Theory. Foa and colleagues (Foa, Steketee & 
Rothbaum, 1989; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) developed the ‘Emotional Processing 
Theory’ suggesting that traumatic events violate one’s basic concept of safety and are 
represented in memory in a way which differs from other experiences. They are 
represented by a fear network that consists of interconnections of different ‘nodes’ 
including event stimulus information (e.g., sights, sounds), information about one’s 
emotional and physiological response, and information about the event meaning. 
 
Node interconnections are very strong and over-inclusive such that encountering a 
stimulus represented in one node (e.g., visual reminder of the traumatic event) will 
activate the entire fear network, which is accompanied by intense hyperarousal. Thus, 
people try to avoid potential triggers, preventing adequate processing of trauma 
material and network modification. When network-activation occurs, people engage in 
behaviours designed to keep themselves safe, further preventing the network from 
being updated. 
 
The Emotional Processing Theory also highlights the importance of pre-trauma 
knowledge about the self, others and the world, suggesting that those with more rigid 
pre-trauma views (either positive or negative) will be particularly susceptible to PTSD. 
This is because the experienced trauma will either completely contradict rigid positive 
beliefs or further reinforce rigid negative beliefs. Negative appraisals of responses and 
behaviours during and after the trauma are also thought to play a role in PTSD 
maintenance (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). 
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Dual-Representation Theory. Brewin and colleagues (Brewin, Dalgleish & 
Joseph, 1996; Brewin, Gregory, Lipton & Burgess, 2010) put forward a ‘Dual-
Representation Theory’ of PTSD, based on the idea of two memory systems that 
operate in parallel. In an early version of this theory (Brewin et al., 1996), a distinction 
was made between the Verbally Accessible Memory (VAM) system, which contains 
memory representations that are embedded in their context in time and under conscious 
control, and the Situationally Accessible Memory (SAM) system, which contains 
lower-level representations that are tightly bound to their basic sensory and affective 
qualities. 
 
In a later revision of this theory, these memory systems were re-named and the 
underlying processes further elaborated. According to these revisions, contextual 
memory (C-memory) contains contextually-bound representations (C-reps) of episodic 
events that become integrated into personal, semantic memory over time. C-reps can 
be recalled at will and used to consider the memory from different viewpoints, and to 
generate meaningful interpretations of an event as well as an abstracted ‘gist’ sense of 
the event. 
 
During encoding, a second, low-level sensation-based (e.g., sights/sounds that may 
receive little conscious attention) memory system (S-memory) is also temporarily 
activated. These sensation-based representations (S-reps) are driven by perception and 
contribute to the initial formation of their corresponding C-rep before decaying and 
becoming relatively inaccessible. Communication between these two systems allows 
(1) events to be appropriately integrated within their autobiographical context (thus 
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preventing the memory being re-experienced in the present) and (2) increased top-down 
control via the C-rep such that memories may be deliberately recalled or suppressed. 
 
During a traumatic event, high levels of arousal have a deleterious effect on the C-
memory system and one’s attention is largely directed towards the source of threat, such 
that very little information is processed in enough detail to enable encoding in the C-
memory system (Brewin et al., 2010). This results in a weak, impoverished C-rep and 
a relatively strong and enduring S-rep, consisting largely of perceptual details. 
 
Furthermore, none of the usual connections between the two representations are 
formed. S-reps can be triggered involuntarily in a bottom-up fashion by situational 
reminders of the event. Uninfluenced by their corresponding C-rep, S-reps lack 
temporal contextualisation and association with autobiographical knowledge, giving 
them their here-and-now nature. Behavioural and cognitive avoidance of flashback 
triggers further prevents the formation of links between C-reps and S-reps and 
maintains the weak and incomplete nature of the C-rep. 
 
 
Cognitive Model. A third, cognitive model (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) suggests 
that pathological trauma responses arise when people process trauma-related 
information in a way that produces a sense of current threat. A number of processes are 
thought to contribute to this sense of current threat, but two major mechanisms are 
suggested. Firstly, negative appraisals of the trauma and aftermath (e.g., 
overgeneralising from the event to perceive many normal activities as dangerous), as 
well as associated safety behaviours, are thought to play a role. Secondly, the nature of 
the trauma memory itself is thought to be important. 
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Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggest an ‘autobiographical memory base’ that is organised 
by themes and personal time periods. The way in which most memories are stored in 
this base enhances a higher-order, meaning-based and intentional retrieval route. 
Trauma memories are poorly elaborated in the autobiographical memory base and are 
inaccessible via the intentional retrieval route. Rather, they are accessed via a second 
route which involves direct, involuntary triggering of memories by stimuli associated 
with the traumatic event. This retrieval route is involuntary and the memories are 
inadequately integrated into their context in time. This explains the uncontrollable and 
‘here-and-now’ sense of flashbacks that gives them their sense of current threat. 
 
The cognitive model also draws on learning theory, suggesting that stimulus-stimulus 
and stimulus-response associations are particularly strong for traumatic material. Thus, 
cues present at the time of the trauma come to act as predictors of imminent danger in 
everyday life, regardless of actual presence of threat. Such mechanisms are intended to 
help organisms predict future danger but, in PTSD, can lead to a sense of current threat 
and retrieval from associative memory that is cue-driven and unintentional. 
 
Treatment implications. All three theories have similar implications for 
treatment, namely, to experience some form of exposure to the trauma memory. Thus, 
‘re-living’ became the treatment of choice. While variations exist, re-living tends to 
involve imaginal exposure (IE) to the traumatic event by closing one’s eyes and reliving 
the trauma, in the mind’s eye as vividly and realistically as possible, including all 
thoughts, feelings and sensations (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). More 
time can be spent on hot spots. Problematic thoughts/beliefs associated with key 
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moments are often subjected to cognitive restructuring techniques, with the alternative 
perspectives then being incorporated into re-living (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 
However, the underlying proposed mechanisms for change differ from theory to theory. 
Proposed mechanisms include activating the fear network in the presence of corrective 
information in order to decrease the association of fear with other elements of the 
trauma memory (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998), and elaborating and integrating the trauma 
memory in context and time to create a coherent account of the trauma (Brewin et al., 
1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000), either to create a new competing representation to block 
the original memory representation (Brewin & Holmes., 2003), or to update and 
elaborate the original memory (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
 
Thus, one of the key differences between theories is whether treatment involves altering 
or elaborating the original memory representation in some way (Emotional Processing 
and Cognitive Models), or whether it involves the creation of a new representation that 
is somehow preferentially retrieved over the original (Dual-Representation Theory). All 
theories suggest that treatment should aim to reduce avoidance in order to learn that 
trauma memories and associated cues are not dangerous in spite of the symptoms that 
they elicit. 
 
Emergence of ImRs 
While the efficacy of IE is well documented (Powers, Halpern, Ferenschak, Gillihan & 
Foa, 2010; Seidler & Wagner, 2006), it is not effective in all cases, for example, when 
clients experience emotions such as shame and guilt, or experience dissociation 
(Grunert et al., 2007; Jaycox & Foa, 1996). As a result, an alternative technique, ImRs, 
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has seen an increase in popularity. Broadly speaking, ImRs is a technique designed to 
target intrusive images (Smucker, 2004) that involves imagining an image as vividly as 
possible, in the here-and-now, and imagining that the sequence of events is changed in 
a way desired by the client (Arntz, 2012). There is considerable variation in how this is 
carried out. 
 
Some approaches offer manualised, structured approaches (e.g., Arntz & Weertman, 
1999; Wild & Clark, 2011) and start by reliving the memory in full before going back 
and making changes. However, Arntz (2011) found that some could not tolerate full 
exposure and thus started to introduce change earlier on in the memory. Some involve 
going back to the time of the trauma as the current adult self (e.g., in cases of child 
abuse) and offering support/assistance (Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Other approaches 
reduce the sense of threat in the image (e.g., by reducing the size of the perpetrator or 
moving them further away), involve conversations with dead people or bring in other 
people and creatures (real or imaginary) to support them in their time of need 
(Hackmann, 2011). Rescripts vary in the amount of time they take and in the amount 
of therapist input. 
 
Efficacy. An emerging body of research shows promising results for ImRs as 
an effective treatment for intrusive images across a range of disorders. In PTSD, ImRs 
has been linked to symptom reduction and greater reduction in anger, shame, guilt and 
dropout rates compared to exposure (Arntz et al., 2007; Grunert et al., 2007; Kindt, 
Buck Arntz, & Soeter, 2007). In social phobia, ImRs is associated with reductions in 
negative social beliefs, vividness and distress of the intrusion and associated early 
memories (Wild, Hackmann & Clark, 2007, 2008). For people who experienced 
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intrusive images as part of depression, ImRs was linked to a decrease in distress caused 
by intrusions (Wheatley, et al., 2007). 
 
How does ImRs Work? 
While there is a growing body of evidence for ImRs efficacy, there is very little research 
on the mechanisms through which ImRs exerts change (Arntz, 2012) and on what 
constitutes a ‘good’ rescripting session (i.e., what are the necessary components needed 
for effective rescripting?). ImRs lacks a comprehensive underlying theoretical 
framework.  
 
This is particularly important given (a) the variation in ImRs approaches and (b) that 
the theories described above suggest that symptom reduction requires repeated 
exposure to the original memory. How, then, can an alternative, imaginary ending 
reduce symptoms? There has been much debate as to how ImRs may be understood in 
relation to existing PTSD theories. While there is no established, comprehensive theory 
of ImRs, a number of potential mechanisms for change have been suggested in the 
absence of an overarching framework. Research is also hindered due to the fact that 
ImRs is rarely carried out in the absence of initial exposure work, making it difficult to 
isolate and evaluate treatment components. 
 
Thus, there are two main questions to consider: (1) what factors are necessary during 
therapy for ImRs to produce clinical change and (2) how is it that these factors bring 
about this change in the underlying memory structures. Both of these questions, starting 
with the latter, will now be discussed with reference to the existing literature. 
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ImRs and its impact on underlying memory representations. There are two 
competing theories as to how ImRs produces change in underlying memory 
representation. 
 
Retrieval competition. Expanding on the Dual-Representation Theory, Brewin 
and colleagues (2006, 2010) developed the Retrieval Competition hypothesis. They 
suggest that ImRs creates a competing, less toxic representation of the traumatic event. 
During rescripting, the existing C-rep is retrieved and held in mind while the client 
reports on the content of the associated S-rep thereby allowing material from the S-rep 
to be fully contextualised within the new C-rep. This new and more elaborated C-rep, 
blends the original negative material with new positive elements. Thus, a new 
representation is created that shares sensory features with the original image but that 
also combines these features with new positive thoughts, emotions and sensations.  
 
If ImRs is successful, this new C-rep will be more accessible than the original in 
response to retrieval cues and will be preferentially retrieved, inhibiting the old image 
(Brewin et al., 2009). Thus, two competing C-reps exist. Brewin argued that retrieval 
of the rescripted image is assisted by retrieval practice, memorability of the new 
representation and general positivity bias (Brewin, 2006). 
 
Change in image meaning. Others have argued that ImRs produces change in 
the underlying meaning or ‘encapsulated belief’ of the existing intrusive image (e.g., 
Hackmann, 2011; Wild & Clark, 2011). They argue that intrusions carry a similar 
underlying negative meaning to the original trauma memory. ImRs may challenge this 
encapsulated belief, creating an image that encapsulates a more realistic and/or less 
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toxic appraisal of the significance of the original event. Some research indicates that, 
when trauma memories are reactivated in imagination, they go into a labile state and 
can then be altered in various ways (e.g., Dudai, 2006). Rather than replacing or 
inhibiting the original representation with a new one, ImRs may prompt meaning 
change while the image is in this malleable state. 
 
Re-evaluation of the US. Some (Arntz, 2015; Arntz & Weertman, 2011) have 
used learning theory principles to explain how this change in meaning might take place. 
They argue that a re-evaluation of the unconditioned stimulus (US), rather than a 
process of habituation or extinction, takes place. Thus, new, helpful information is fed 
into the memory representation of the US (i.e., the trauma itself), thereby reducing the 
dysfunctional meaning of the memory. Subsequently, when triggers are encountered, it 
is the changed memory representation that is recalled and, due to the change in 
meaning, this no longer leads to dysfunctional responses. This occurs independent of 
context. Thus, the fear memory has been reconsolidated with a different meaning, no 
longer giving rise to a fear response (Arntz, 2011; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). 
 
This could be considered partially in-line with the Emotional Processing Theory (Foa 
et al., 1989, 1998), which suggests that activating the fear network in the presence of 
new information serves to decrease the association of fear with other elements of the 
trauma memory. ImRs may serve to alter the fear network through changes to the 
‘meaning’ node. However, the Emotional Processing Theory does suggest that change 
occurs through habituation, rather than US re-evaluation. 
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Shift in processing style. Similar to US re-evaluation, Kindt et al. (2007) also 
argue for a re-conceptualisation of the idea that extensive exposure to perceptual 
elements of the trauma memory in IE and ImRs promotes fear activation and 
habituation (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986). They suggest that the meaning of a memory is 
transformed (i.e., a shift in conceptual processing takes place) due to prolonged focus 
on sensory, perceptual details of the trauma memory during treatment. Thus, rather than 
habituating to various cues, perceptual processing during treatment may lead to a more 
realistic database such that functional conceptual processing may follow. 
 
Results showed that, while effects of perceptual processing during treatment on 
outcome levels were subsumed by the beneficial effects of conceptual processing after 
treatment, the two processing styles were correlated. Kindt et al. (2007) suggest that 
perceptual processing may promote a transfer to subsequent increases in conceptual 
processing which has beneficial effects on outcome. Thus, perceptual processing during 
treatment may allow for, and promote, a subsequent shift in meaning (conceptual 
processing). While this work is promising in terms of uncovering mechanisms and 
processes at work during treatment, both IE and ImRs were used, making it difficult to 
disentangle exactly which treatment components were responsible for the identified 
processes. 
 
ImRs factors necessary to produce clinical change. This section summarises 
the multitude of factors that may be necessary to the therapeutic process in order to 
produce clinical change. Whether these factors are thought to contribute to a new, 
competing memory, or a change in the meaning of the original is often 
unspecified/unclear in the literature. This is highlighted in the following subsections. 
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Vividness. Vividness, a complex concept, describes the luminosity and clarity 
of an image, and the extent to which one’s experience of an image is in line with the 
actual perceptual experience (Pearson, Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Heyes & Holmes, 
2011). Trauma memories have been found to be more vivid in those with PTSD, relative 
to those without (Bernsten, Willert & Rubin, 2004), and there is some evidence that IE 
(Hackmann et al., 2004) and ImRs (Wild et al., 2007) decreases the vividness of 
intrusions. However, some work also suggests that self-reported vividness has poor 
test-retest reliability (Wild et a., 2008). Within ImRs literature, it may also be unclear 
to participants whether they are rating the vividness of the original image, the rescript 
or a combination. 
 
Other than the work of Salter (2014), discussed later, there is no work directly assessing 
the role of vividness within the rescripting process itself. However, findings from the 
general vividness literature provide a compelling rationale for the idea that creating a 
highly vivid, less distressing, alternative image during ImRs may make it easier to 
access it and bring it to mind. Evidence suggests that, the more vivid an image is, the 
more likely it is to be recalled (regardless of image accuracy), and the more an image 
is brought to mind, the easier image access becomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
 
Thus, in line with the Retrieval Competition Hypothesis, it has been suggested that 
increasing image vividness may be one way of enhancing accessibility of the new image 
such that it is preferentially retrieved over the original image. However, it could also 
be argued that a highly vivid rescript may enhance the process of meaning change or 
the belief in the new meaning associated with the original image. 
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Change in cognitions/beliefs and emotions. Long and Quevillon (2009) argue 
that, if negative imagery triggers negative thoughts, positive imagery may facilitate 
positive cognitions, suggesting that ImRs creates a shift in negative appraisals regarding 
the original event/intrusions. Rusch, Grunert, Mendelsohn and Smucker (2000) linked 
ImRs to reduced feelings of helplessness and more attributions of self-efficacy. 
Wheatley and Hackmann (2011) suggest that, in order to be effective, rescripting must 
have a link to the key cognitions associated with the original event. It has also been 
suggested that ImRs may lead to spontaneous cognitive restructuring, for example, re-
appraisal of the behaviour of self or others based on availability of a wider range of 
information, or the realisation that avoidance is not as important as originally assumed 
(Hackmann, 2011). 
 
In the context of traumatic stimuli, emotional memory tends to be imagery-based in 
nature (Arntz, de Groot & Kindt 2005). Conversely, mental imagery is more emotional 
than verbal processing of the same material (Holmes & Matthews, 2005). Thus, 
Holmes, Arntz and Smucker (2007) suggest a bi-directional relationship whereby 
emotional memory is perceptual and perceptual imagery is emotional. Thus, it is 
possible that ImRs brings about change through the creation of accessible, emotionally 
relevant images, thereby reducing emotional avoidance and facilitating 
contextualisation. ImRs also often introduces new emotions into images. People often 
choose to rescript images in positive and even humorous ways, perhaps making it safer 
to approach aspects of the original memory, thus enhancing processing (Salter, 2014). 
 
While emotional and cognitive change is likely to be important for effective ImRs, 
whether this process allows new emotions/cognitions into the fear network (e.g., Foa et 
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al., 1989), weakens learned associations between the stimulus and conditioned response 
(e.g., Ehlers & Clarke, 2000), changes the emotional/cognitive meaning of the US (e.g., 
Arntz, 2015) or enhances recall of the new image due to positivity bias (e.g., Brewin, 
2006) is unclear. 
 
Mastery and compassion. Many have argued that it is specifically through the 
promotion of mastery and/or compassion that ImRs exerts therapeutic change. Mastery-
imagery, which involves the client taking control of the traumatic situation in some 
way, may reduce feelings of helplessness and increase ability to take more active 
control over one’s present life (Wheatley et al., 2007). Compassionate-imagery, which 
involves visualising a figure that nurtures or soothes clients during the distressing event, 
may decrease negative appraisals (e.g., self-blame, shame) (Wheatley et al., 2007). 
 
Thus, mastery- and/or compassion-imagery may be a mechanism through which ImRs 
produces strong cognitive and emotional change. Again, it is difficult to know whether 
such changes serve to change the meaning of the original image or to enhance the recall 
of a competing image. 
 
 Summary. A range of isolated, potential mechanisms for change in ImRs and 
their hypothetical impact on underlying memory structures have been suggested. 
However, there is little concrete research within this area. One recent study has tried to 
explore how these factors may relate to outcome.  Tentative findings from Salter (2014) 
suggest that activation of thoughts, feelings and emotions was important for change in 
rescripting. However, if processes associated with original imagery elements were too 
strong, people were less likely to experience symptom change. A similar pattern for 
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vividness was found in that, while creation of highly vivid new imagery was effective, 
overly vivid original imagery made it difficult for people to remain engaged with the 
ImRs process, leading to poorer outcomes. The extent to which people found the 
rescript believable also seemed to link to the amount of cognitive and emotional change 
experienced which, in turn, linked to outcome. 
 
While this study represents a promising first step, there were a number of 
methodological issues, and findings remain extremely tentative. In the following 
section, an alternative mechanism, which helps draw together a number of the ideas 
presented so far, is suggested. The specific ways in which this may produce therapeutic 
change is also explored. 
 
The Simulation Heuristic 
Another avenue for exploration, the simulation heuristic (SH), extends some of the 
mechanisms (e.g., vividness and accessibility) discussed above. While not a new 
concept, the SH has not yet been considered within the ImRs framework. The SH 
describes the process of constructing a mental model of reality in which a hypothetical 
event takes place (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and 
encapsulates factors such as logical/temporal sequencing, level of detail and ease of 
imagining. Ease of construction of the mental scenario determines one’s subjective 
probability judgement for the event. 
 
Coding schemes for ‘goodness of simulation’ (GOS; how well one can simulate a 
hypothetical event in imagination) have been developed and used to explore underlying 
mechanisms in various disorders. GOS was associated with higher subjective 
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probability ratings for hypothetical, negative events as well as increased access to these 
simulations in anxious patients (Raune, MacLeod & Holmes, 2005). Less coherent 
simulations for hypothetical positive events have also been associated with lower 
subjective probabilities and higher levels of worry (Brown, MacLeod, Tata & Goddard, 
2002). Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) showed higher GOS ratings 
when simulating a scenario relevant to their core OCD fear than for other OCD and 
non-OCD fears (Keen, Brown & Wheatley, 2008). 
 
While the SH has not been applied within PTSD treatment literature, some have 
considered the disorder itself from a simulation perspective. It has been suggested that 
PTSD, and anxiety disorders in general, may represent extremes on a continuum of the 
human ability to mentally simulate past and potential future events (Miloyan, Bulley & 
Suddendorf, 2015). Episodic foresight (the ability to simulate hypothetical future 
events) and the fact that people experience the event-related emotions in the present, 
allows humans to guide behaviour in a manner that both reduces possible future threats 
to fitness and/or reduce the impact of these events if they do occur. PTSD has been 
associated with a tendency to generate highly generalised simulations of past and future 
events (Brown et al., 2013), leading some to suggest that it is an extreme manifestation 
of this biological response that puts people in an extended state of preparedness for 
subsequent catastrophe (Cantor, 2009). 
 
This is at odds with the general belief that trauma memories in people with PTSD are 
inherently incoherent and fragmented. However, a recent study found no significant 
differences in coherence of trauma memories relative to non-trauma memories in those 
with PTSD. Nor did they find differences in coherence of a range of memory types in 
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those with PTSD relative to those without PTSD (Rubin et al., 2016). This evidence is 
particularly compelling as coherence was measured via three methods: subjective 
participant ratings, objectively by blind raters and through a computer program. 
 
Thus, the SH seems like an intuitively useful framework in which to consider how ImRs 
might work. Both ImRs and the SH are based on the mental construction of an 
imaginary event that did not or could not happen. Perhaps, the better the simulation 
involved in the rescript, the more accessible or memorable it is. According to Tversky 
and Kahneman (1973, 1982), ease of simulation also predicts subjective probability 
ratings. While ImRs obviously involves past events, perhaps well-simulated rescripts 
increase some sort of felt sense that it is realistic, which then might have an impact on 
emotional and cognitive change and ease of retrieval. 
 
Thus, the SH is a framework that may serve to link together some of the mechanisms 
already discussed in previous sections. Level of detail and vividness, for example, is 
encompassed within the SH coding framework. Because vividness promotes recall and, 
subsequently, access to an image (Tversky & Khaneman, 1973), a well-simulated 
rescript may be more likely to inhibit the old image, in accordance with Brewin’s (2006) 
Retrieval Competition hypothesis. Indeed, Raune et al., (2005) found that anxious 
patients had increased access to their simulations for negative events relative to control 
participants. Alternatively, high levels of simulation may promote a shift in conceptual 
meaning that leads to meaning change in the original image. 
 
Furthermore, Taylor and Schneider (1989) suggest that simulation allows people to 
interpret past events and alter their emotional states. Perhaps a rescript with greater 
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coherence makes it easier for people to connect with new appraisals or emotional 
content included within the rescript. A well-simulated rescript that ‘feels’ realistic may 
also enhance one’s connection with the sense of mastery/compassion and new meanings 
incorporated within a rescript. Of course, there is currently a lack of evidence to back 
up any of these hypotheses. 
 
Summary. GOS may represent a mechanism for change in ImRs and may 
provide a conceptual framework in which to consider how ImRs produces symptom 
change more generally. A focus on coherence of simulation leads to the consideration 
of two more potential avenues for change in PTSD: counterfactual thinking and global 
meaning. Both concepts are relevant to the process of recovery in PTSD and constructs 
of coherence and simulation are also relevant to both. 
 
Traumatic Events and Counterfactual Thinking 
Counterfactual thinking refers to the process of creating and imagining alternative 
realities in reference to past events (i.e., imagining ways that things could have turned 
out differently), and often comes in the form ‘if only…’ or ‘what if…’ (Byrne, 2016). 
Counterfactual thoughts can focus on imagining how an event could have been better 
(upward) or worse (downward), and can be self-, other- or non-referent (focusing on 
how factors/behaviours relating to oneself, other people or the world in general could 
have been different).  Counterfactual thinking is more likely to occur after bad events 
than good (Sanna & Turley, 1996), and these counterfactuals tend to be upward in 
nature (de Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter & Giovanello, 2013). Upward counterfactual 
thinking, when self-referent, can lead to feelings of guilt, shame, self-blame and regret 
35 
 
(Mandel & Dhami, 2005; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2007). 
 
A functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008) proposes that, 
despite its emotional cost, counterfactual thinking plays an important role in behaviour 
regulation and performance improvement. Thus, within the non-clinical population, 
following a negative event, the emotional cost of upward counterfactual thinking is 
balanced by adaptive outcomes, such as learning from the past in order to better prepare 
for the future and consequent decreases in counterfactual thinking. However, within the 
clinical population, this is not always the case and counterfactual thinking can become 
dysfunctional and sustained (Byrne, 2016). An excess in counterfactual thinking has 
been implicated in a range of mental health disorders (Epstude & Roese, 2008) where 
heightened counterfactualising leads to an excess of both problem-focused cognitions 
and negative emotion. 
 
Within the trauma literature, frequency of counterfactual thinking in PTSD has been 
associated with continuing levels of posttraumatic distress (El-Leithy, Brown & 
Robbins, 2006). High levels of upward, self-referent counterfactual thinking in relation 
to the traumatic event have been found (Davis, et al., 1995), with higher levels of 
counterfactual thought being linked to increased distress. Branscombe, Wohl, Owen 
Allison and N’gbala (2003) found a similar link between upward counterfactual 
thinking and decreased well-being, with this link being mediated by self-blame. They 
also found a relationship between non-referent counterfactual thinking and decreased 
well-being, although this was not mediated by self-blame. One study that looked at 
early predictors of treatment response to trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy 
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(TF-CBT) found significantly higher levels of perseverative thinking in non-responders 
compared to responders (Brady, Warnock-Parkes, Barker & Ehlers, 2015). Authors 
suggest that perseverative thinking styles need to be identified and addressed early in 
trauma treatment.   
 
Some have suggested that improved preparation for the future, which usually results 
from counterfactual thinking, is likely to take place only when it is combined with the 
expectation that (a) the event is highly likely to recur and (b) the improved outcome is 
attainable (Branscombe et al., 2003; Sanna, 1997). Thus, repeatedly mentally undoing 
the trauma in combination with the realisation that this outcome is unattainable (i.e., 
the trauma cannot be reversed) may lead to poor-trauma adjustment without any future 
benefits (Branscombe et al., 2003). When counterfactual thinking is not provided with 
its usual outlet and reduced through the formation of a future plan, it may persist, thus 
perpetuating the negative effects on well-being. 
 
Counterfactual thinking and ImRs. Like ImRs, counterfactual thinking can 
be conceptualised as the simulation of hypothetical events, but in a way that is 
unhelpful. Because counterfactual thought and ImRs share this link, it is possible that 
effective ImRs represents a therapeutic means for channelling hypothetical thinking in 
such a way that persistent counterfactual thinking subsides. Thus, ImRs may effect 
change in PTSD through a reduction in counterfactual thought and associated distress. 
Furthermore, due to the nature of both phenomena and their reliance on mental 
simulation, it is possible that, the higher the GOS rating of a given rescript, the greater 
the reduction in counterfactual frequency and distress. 
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De Brigard, Szpunar and Schacter (2013) explored the effects of repeated simulation 
on counterfactuals in relation to past events in the non-clinical population. While 
repeated simulation of counterfactuals increased the level of detail and ease of 
imagining of the imagined scenarios, this was associated with a decrease in perceived 
plausibility. The authors argue that a clear simulation of the alternatives represented in 
the counterfactuals helped to bring the divergent details of the real and imagined events 
into sharper focus. This may be adaptive as it leads to the perception that a high level 
of change would have been necessary to impact on the actual outcome, thus reducing 
the need for further counterfactual thinking. 
 
Taken at face value, this seems to be at odds with the ideas discussed earlier, which 
suggest that ease of simulation predicts higher subjective probability ratings (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973, 1982). However, it is possible that two levels of plausibility are at 
work here. On the one hand, perhaps a well-simulated rescript increases a sort of felt 
(rather than logical) sense that it is realistic. However, perhaps on a more logical level, 
a highly coherent rescript also facilitates an understanding of the amount of change 
required for the content of their counterfactuals to have been possible at the time, thus 
facilitating a sense of acceptance in relation to the event and in relation to one’s own 
ability to have effected change. 
 
Further support for the potential utility of ImRs in reducing counterfactual thought 
comes from a study that compared the content of intrusive memories and thoughts in 
PTSD. A distinction has traditionally been made between intrusive memories, which 
are considered to consist largely of sensory experiences, and intrusive thoughts, which 
consist of cognitive evaluations and contain little or no sensory material (Ehlers, 
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Hackman & Michael, 2004).  However, one study found that, while intrusive memories 
and thoughts (including counterfactual thoughts) were phenomenologically distinct, 
almost half of their sample reported that their predominant ruminative and 
counterfactual thoughts were perceived as sensory experiences as well (Speckens, 
Ehlers, Hackmann, Ruths & Clark, 2007). The idea that counterfactual thought may 
involve sensory elements would strengthen the hypothesis that ImRs, an image based 
intervention, may provide an accessible means to modify the impact of sensation-based 
thought processes. 
 
Traumatic Events and Global Meaning 
Current theories of psychological disorders have tended to focus on factors that 
distinguish one disorder from another. The theories described previously tended to 
focus on PTSD-specific tasks of integrating the event within memory and re-appraising 
specific beliefs relating to the event. While these theories are of obvious use, they 
overlook broader transdiagnostic constructs that may play an important role, such as 
one’s overall sense of personal or global meaning (which is conceptually distinct from 
meaning assigned to the traumatic event discussed previously).  Such constructs played 
a more central role in earlier PTSD theories. Baumeister (1991) described this sense of 
global meaning as ‘mental representations of possible relationships among things, 
events and relationships. Thus meaning connects things’. McAdams (1993) suggested 
that people are motivated to both make a coherent, continuous and meaningful life 
story, and to construct stories that make sense of life events. Antonovsky (1979) further 
suggested that people who possess a strong sense of coherence to this story are more 
likely to cope with adverse life events. Global meaning is thought to be particularly 
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important when people are confronted with highly stressful life experiences (Park, 
2010). 
 
Numerous theories have attempted to explain the relationship between PTSD and 
global meaning. While there are discrepancies between them, all converge on a set of 
principles about which there is a high degree of consensus. These have been 
amalgamated into one theory by Park and Folkman (1997, 2010). They suggest that 
people’s sense of global meaning acts as a set of orienting systems that helps them to 
interpret experiences. This consists of beliefs, life-goals and a subjective sense of 
purpose in life. Global meaning also encompasses beliefs that the world is benevolent, 
predictable and meaningful and that the self is worthy.  Traumatic events pose a 
challenge to one’s sense of global meaning and necessitates that some sort of appraisal, 
or situation-specific meaning, is given to the event. The extent of the discrepancy 
between the assigned event-meaning and one’s global meaning will determine the level 
of distress experienced. The distress caused by this discrepancy initiates a process of 
‘meaning making’ where one attempts to restore a sense of the world as meaningful 
and their life as worthwhile. This is thought to lead to better adjustment to the stressful 
event. Thus, this process will involve an initial loss of meaning below a previous level 
of functioning, a recovery of meaning and an element of growth beyond this level in 
order to encompass the traumatic event (Brown, Roach, Irving & Joseph, 2008). 
 
Unlike ImRs, literature on meaning has focused on building up rich and complex 
theories. However, empirical work is lacking.  Some aspects of the model, for example, 
that most individuals report meaning making attempts, the identification of new 
meaning following stressful events and that appraised meanings of events that violate 
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global meaning are linked to distress, are well supported (Park, 2010).  Research on 
other aspects of this model, such as whether distress is the driving force behind the 
search for meaning, is lacking. Empirical work on many elements of the model, such 
as whether meaning-making attempts actually lead to a change in meaning and 
subsequent adjustment, is inconsistent. For example, one longitudinal study found that 
higher levels of personal growth reported by soldiers five months post-deployment 
predicted more PTSD symptoms at 15-month follow-up (Engelhard, Lommen & 
Sijbrandij, 2014). However, the measure of personal growth used was subjective and 
unrelated to actual growth (Frazier et al., 2009).  Updegraff, Cohen-Silver and Holman 
(2008) found that, following the 9/11 attacks in America, people who reported engaging 
in a search for meaning in the early aftermath, and were unable to find meaning, were 
more likely to report posttraumatic symptoms over the following two years than those 
who did not search for meaning. However, those who were able to find an explanation 
following a search for meaning reported a decrease in feelings of vulnerability and 
fewer symptoms. Thus, while there is still debate over many of the finer points of 
meaning, there is general consensus that people construct coherent life narratives in 
order to derive meaning from events and that this is in some way disrupted by traumatic 
events, leading to a search for new meanings. 
 
Global meaning and ImRs. Again, like ImRs, global meaning can be 
considered, to an extent, within the context of the SH. Coherence has been described as 
a central aspect to theories of meaning and life-narrative (Brown et al., 2008; 
Heintzelman & King, 2014). Furthermore, there is evidence that a sense-of-self is 
dependent on the coherence and continuity of one’s narrative structure (Baumeister & 
Wilson, 1996). Mental simulation and its associations with enhanced meaning has been 
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studied within the non-clinical population in relation to non-traumatic life events. One 
series of studies found that one’s sense of meaning in life could be enhanced by both 
temporal and spatial simulation (Waytz, Hershfield & Tamir, 2015). They also found 
that meaning increased as a function of level of detail, one of the features of GOS. 
However, these studies were carried out within the normal population and authors do 
question whether constant and unintentional simulation, as opposed to occasional 
simulation, may operate differently. 
 
Summary. Of interest to the current discussion is the thread of coherent 
simulation that is potentially common to both ImRs and global meaning. If a high level 
of coherence and simulation is necessary for both ImRs efficacy and a sense of life 
meaning, this prompts the question of whether enhanced simulation in ImRs might, in 
part, confer benefits through the process of improving coherence of life meaning more 
globally, thus increasing one’s sense of personal and global meaning. Thus, while ImRs 
and a well-simulated rescript may confer immediate therapeutic benefits through 
reducing factors like distress and interference caused by the image, it may also have a 
more global impact on well-being through its ability to enhance one’s overarching sense 
of meaning in life. Similarly, in relation to the previous discussion on counterfactual 
thinking, ImRs may reduce specific counterfactual thoughts related to the image in 
question. However, it may also have an impact on one’s general level of counterfactual 
thinking. Thus, when looking at potential therapeutic gains in ImRs, it is important to 
focus on both (1) specific, image-related factors and (2) more global, overarching 
markers of well-being. 
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Methodology 
A central problem for researchers is that the development and maintenance of PTSD, 
and treatments such as IE and ImRs, are extremely complex processes. Thus, it is 
difficult to go beyond the level of finding concrete associations through the use of 
questionnaire and laboratory research methods, which tend to emphasise static 
constructs. These only allow for tentative suggestions about the potential mechanisms 
or processes underlying such associations. Research directly illuminating the actual 
mechanisms themselves is scarce. Questionnaire and laboratory-based research is also 
unlikely to be personally engaging enough to elicit the sustained and elaborate 
processes at work.  This is problematic given that target phenomena in day-to-day 
clinical practice are, most often, not static constructs. Instead, they are processes such 
as worry or flashbacks that are dynamic, cyclical and repetitive by nature. Two 
methodological techniques can be utilised to address such issues; coding frameworks 
and single-case experimental designs (SCED). 
 
Coding frameworks. An emerging body of research has attempted to directly 
explore underlying mechanisms in PTSD and treatment by coding clients’ accounts of 
trauma and/or recordings of treatment sessions for specific variables. These can then be 
tracked across time and related to each other or to specific outcome measures.  
 
For example, in terms of the development and maintenance of PTSD, participants’ 
trauma accounts have been coded for indicators of processes such as perceptual and 
conceptual processing and peri-traumatic dissociation. Such coding work demonstrates 
that perceptual (rather than conceptual) representations of the trauma memory and peri-
traumatic dissociation both seem to relate independently to PTSD symptomology 
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(Buck, Kindt, Hout, Steens & Linders, 2006). Halligan, Michael, Clark and Ehlers 
(2003) found that peri-traumatic dissociation may lead to disorganised trauma 
memories because it is characterised by superficial processing of the traumatic event. 
They also found that level of disorganisation of the trauma narrative is higher in those 
with PTSD and that the degree of disorganisation predicts PTSD symptomology. Thus, 
coding research has begun to make sense of the finer details of how PTSD develops 
and is maintained. 
 
Through a similar use of coding recorded treatment sessions, a significant decrease in 
thought disorganisation has been linked to significant improvement in PTSD 
symptomology following IE (Minnen, Wessel, Dijkstra & Roelofs, 2002). In the study 
by Kindt et al. (2007) discussed earlier, it was through the use of coding treatment 
sessions that they were able to specify links between perceptual and conceptual 
processing, and outcome. Given that the underlying mechanisms of ImRs are unclear, 
such a coding approach would be useful and informative in this area. 
 
SCED. SCEDs involve comparing performance under different conditions 
within an individual, rather than either within or between groups (Kazdin, 1978). A 
number of single cases can be tracked, allowing for patterns to emerge across a series 
of individual cases. Rather than using a control group, SCED relies on repeated 
measurement, following participants for a period of time before, as well as during, 
treatment (Turpin, 2001). Data during treatment is compared to data prior to treatment 
in order to determine whether a change can be associated with treatment onset, 
effectively allowing participants to act as their own control. However, in order for 
concrete conclusions to be drawn, a stable baseline phase is required. Otherwise, it is 
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difficult to determine whether changes can be attributed specifically to treatment onset. 
Rather than detecting robust treatment effects in large samples (e.g., reduction of 
symptomology), SCEDs allow for a closer look at the nuances of processes that emerge 
over time within a person and whether similar process patterns can be seen across a 
series of individuals. Such an approach is readily applicable to an investigation of the 
processes at work during ImRs sessions and how these might relate to change. 
 
SCED and coding in ImRs. One study attempted to make sense of the array of 
literature on proposed mechanisms in ImRs through the use of these two 
methodological techniques. Salter (2014) designed a coding scheme to capture relevant 
aspects of ImRs sessions and then applied this scheme to recordings of ImRs sessions 
to investigate which ImRs aspects might relate to treatment outcome in a series of six 
cases. While the preliminary findings from this study, discussed earlier, provide a useful 
and much needed first step towards uncovering ImRs processes, there were two 
limitations in particular that the current study intended to address. 
 
Firstly, out of six participants, only four had the minimum number of required baseline 
points (three) and only one of these was stable. Only two participants had follow-up 
data. This makes it difficult to associate changes in outcome with identified ImRs 
components and to determine whether changes are sustained beyond treatment. From 
an experimental standpoint, there was insufficient evidence to attribute symptom 
reduction to identified ImRs components. The current study intended to address this 
limitation by attempting to ensure a stable baseline, or introduce statistical means of 
correcting for unstable baselines if necessary, and by attempting to ensure that follow-
up data was collected. 
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Secondly, Salter (2014) developed the coding scheme in a bottom-up process, looking 
out for and coding those qualitative ImRs components that were observable and 
manifest within sessions. While a number of useful components were identified, other 
less observable processes that may not be so amenable to detection through this type of 
coding may have been missed. For example, the scheme does not capture the detailed 
imaginal nature of ImRs scenarios or the fact that they involve the generation of events 
that have not actually occurred. Incorporating a more top-down coding process, such as 
the GOS coding scheme, would allow for these less readily observable characteristics 
to be identified and coded. Thus, the current study intended to enhance existing coding 
through the use of GOS coding. 
 
The Current Study 
Through the use of SCED and coding, this study aimed to explore processes that take 
place during ImRs, and how these might produce clinical change. Particular attention 
was paid to the concept of simulation in terms of how it might serve a common link 
between various treatment and outcome components. The study was also interested in 
change at both an immediate, image-specific level (e.g., image distress, controllability, 
frequency, strength of encapsulated belief) and a more global level of well-being (e.g., 
personal meaning in life). Two phases were conducted. 
 
A key aim of the first phase, which made use of archival data, was to develop a reliable 
GOS Coding Framework for use within ImRs. This phase was also used to check the 
reliability of an abbreviated version of Salter’s (2014) coding scheme, the ‘Session 
Content’ coding scheme. Thus, by the end of Phase 1, two complementary coding 
schemes were available – one coding for more general aspects of rescripting, and one 
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(GOS) coding more specifically for the dynamic nature of the imagined scenarios 
contained in ImRs. 
 
Phase 2 prospectively followed 7 participants during ImRs treatment for PTSD using a 
SCED design. Participants completed measures related to Image Intrusiveness 
(contains key markers of flashbacks – frequency, distress, interference with daily life, 
controllability and sense of ‘nowness’ to the image), their encapsulated belief, 
counterfactual thinking and meaning. Session recordings were retrospectively coded 
using the two coding schemes. Broadly speaking, the aim of this phase was to explore 
whether there was a relationship between a reduction in outcome measures and the 
degree to which elements represented in the two coding schemes were present/absent 
during rescripting. 
 
Participants were divided into high- and low- treatment responders based on reductions 
in symptom severity (a combination of frequency and distress of imagery). It was then 
possible to compare high- and low-responders at a group level in terms of outcome 
measures and coding. Participants were also explored at an individual level in order to 
examine nuances within treatment. 
 
Phase 2 thus provided the opportunity to attempt to replicate the initial, tentative 
findings of Salter (2014). However, this study was particularly interested in the concept 
of simulation. Thus, of particular interest, was whether changes in symptom severity, 
at group level, were linked to how well a rescript was simulated. It also aimed to explore 
whether simulation could be linked to Image Intrusiveness and encapsulated belief 
measures at an individual level. Furthermore, the study aimed to explore whether ImRs 
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reduced counterfactual thinking and, if so, whether this was mediated by the GOS rating 
of the rescripted image. Finally, the present research aimed to investigate whether ImRs 
related to an increase in one’s sense of personal meaning.  
 
A number of hypotheses were made. Firstly, that higher GOS ratings would link to 
greater reductions in outcome measures at both a group (high-responders vs low-
responders) and individual level. Secondly, that high-responders would show greater 
reductions in counterfactual thinking relative to low-responders, and that this would be 
linked to GOS ratings. It was also predicted that higher GOS ratings would relate to 
higher levels of change in frequency and distress of specific counterfactual thoughts at 
an individual level. Thirdly, it was hypothesised that high-responders would show a 
greater increase in global meaning, and that this would, again, be linked to GOS ratings. 
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Method 
Two phases were involved. Phase 1 was used to assess the inter-rater reliability of the 
abbreviated ‘Session Content’ coding scheme and to adapt the ‘Goodness of 
Simulation’ (GOS) coding scheme for use within ImRs and assess inter-rater reliability. 
Phase 2 prospectively applied the two coding schemes to recordings of participants’ 
therapy sessions in order to explore which elements of the Session Content and GOS 
coding schemes related to therapeutic change. 
 
Phase 1 
Participants. Phase 1 participants were recruited as part of Salter’s (2014) 
original study. Four men and two women with a mean age of 43 (SD=19, range=20-65) 
took part in Phase 1. Participants came from a range of different ethnic backgrounds 
including Asian/Asian British (n=3), White or White British (n=2) and Black African 
(n=1). All participants had a primary diagnosis of PTSD as well as various co-
morbidities including depression (n=3), depersonalisation disorder (n=1), anger (n=1) 
and complicated grief (n=1). One participant had experienced a once-off trauma, while 
the others had experienced multiple traumatic events.  As this information is taken from 
Salter’s (2014) original study, in which an in-depth discussion of each case was 
conducted, some demographic information has been altered to preserve anonymity.  
 
Participants who experienced intrusive images as part of their PTSD and who were 
willing to undergo ImRs as part of their treatment were included in this phase. All were 
receiving TF-CBT. No modifications were made to usual treatment, which involved at 
least one ImRs session. Provided that rescripting involved changing the original 
49 
 
distressing image, all types of images were included. Participants were followed for the 
entire duration of ImRs or until the recruitment deadline for this phase ended. All 
participants continued to receive treatment when the study concluded. 
 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited through two National Health Services 
(NHS), one out-patient and one in-patient. Both services saw people with a primary 
diagnosis of PTSD. Four clinicians took part in this phase; three for the out-patient and 
one for the in-patient service. All were trained in ImRs and received frequent 
supervision. 
 
Ethics. The current project extended a previous project through a number of 
major amendments. Original approval was granted through the North West-Lancaster 
National Research Ethics Committee on 22 May 2013. Approval was subsequently 
granted by Royal Holloway University Department Ethics Committee (RHUL-DEC) 
and relevant local Research and Development (R&D) departments. Phase 1 data 
collection was carried out by Salter based on this approval. A substantial amendment 
was made to change the name of the Principal Investigator (approval granted on 28 May 
2015), thus providing access to this archived data for further analysis. (See Appendices 
1-7 for Approval Letters). 
 
Materials. 
Goodness of Simulation (GOS) coding scheme. The GOS coding scheme has 
already been developed and validated for hypothetical scenarios in worry, OCD and 
paranoia (Brown, MacLeod, Tata & Goddard, 2002; Huddy, Brown, Boyd & Wykes, 
2012; Keen, Brown & Wheatley, 2008). The current version was adapted from that of 
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Rose, Brown, Ellett and Huddy (2012) and consists of six codes. Each code was rated 
on a three-point scale (1=’Not true or mostly not true’, 2=’Partially true’ & 3=’Mostly 
true/clearly there’). A full description of the scheme can be found in Appendix 9, but 
Table 1 provides a brief description of each of the six codes. 
 
Table 1. 
Summary of GOS Codes. 
Logical Sequencing Extent to which successive elements of a 
scenario are connected logically, with 
each step following from the previous 
one. 
Temporal Ordering Extent to which there is a sense of 
temporal flow, with the scenario 
unfolding over time. 
Minimisation of Uncertainty Extent to which the scenario decreases a 
sense of uncertainty about what is being 
described. 
Good Level of Detail Extent to which the scenario gives a 
comprehensive account of all of the basic 
elements of the situation. 
Easy to Imagine Extent to which the scenario is described 
and easy to imagine. 
Flows Smoothly A subjective, global judgment of how 
well the scenario flows. 
 
Session Content Coding Scheme. An abbreviated version of the Session 
Content coding scheme originally developed by Salter (2014) was used in this study. 
The scheme involved ten codes which were rated on a scale of 0-3. Each rating was 
anchored with specific descriptions. The full version of the Session Content coding 
scheme can be seen in Appendix 10, but Table 2 provides a brief description of each of 
the ten codes. 
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Table 2. 
Summary of Session Content Codes. 
Image Departure Extent to which the rescript departs from the original 
imagery in terms of the amount of new material being 
introduced. 
Timing of Change The point in time when new information is introduced 
into the imagery. 
Staying with Imagery Participant’s ability to continuously activate and stay 
with the imagery throughout the rescripting process. 
Therapist Guidance Participant’s ability to follow the rescripting process 
and incorporate changes without significant guidance 
from the therapist. 
Original Imagery 
Activation 
Participant’s ability to visualise original imagery 
elements as indicated by vividness of description. 
New Imagery Activation Participant’s ability to visualise new imagery elements 
as indicated by vividness of description. 
Original Processes Level of activation of emotions, cognitions and/or 
psychical sensations associated with original imagery 
elements. 
New Processes Level of activation of emotions, cognitions and/or 
psychical sensations associated with new imagery 
elements. 
Cognitive/Emotional 
Shift 
Extent to which the meaning associated with the 
original imagery changes during the rescripting process. 
Believability of Rescript Extent to which the rescript feels believable and 
compelling to the client regardless of whether it is 
physically possible. 
 
Procedure. The abbreviated Session Content scheme was retrospectively 
applied to recordings of ImRs sessions by two researchers (KL & CS). KL, who then 
used the scheme in Phase 2, applied the codes to all available sessions (18 sessions) in 
order to become very familiar and well-practiced with the scheme. 
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The GOS scheme was adapted for use within ImRs through discussions with one of the 
original authors of the earliest GOS coding scheme (Brown et al., 2002). Once a scheme 
had been agreed upon, two researchers (KL & ZC) retrospectively applied the codes to 
the final ImRs session of three randomly selected participants (50% of the sample). 
Both researchers first discussed the coding scheme to ensure a shared understanding. 
They then rated the first tape and subsequently compared codes. Where discrepancies 
existed, researchers discussed how they had arrived at the given ratings. A consensus 
was agreed and any necessary clarifications/alterations were made to the GOS coding 
scheme. The second and third recordings were coded in the same way. 
 
KL, who then used the scheme in Phase 2, applied the codes to the final ImRs session 
of each participant in order to become familiar and well-practiced before using the 
coding scheme in the prospective phase. 
 
Phase 2 
Participants. Seven participants (5 female, 2 male) took part in Phase 2. The 
sample was heterogeneous and all but one had experienced multiple traumatic events 
in their lives. The mean age was 30.7 years (SD=9; range=20-45). Participants were 
from a range of ethnic backgrounds including white British/European (n=3), 
Asian/Asian-British (n=3) and Middle Eastern (n=1). See Table 3 for individual 
participant details. In order to protect participant anonymity, some details have been 
changed.
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Table 3. 
Individual Participant Information. 
P Gender Age Ethnicity Previous Treatment Medication Co-morbidities Time since 
Trauma 
Current Treatment 
Duration 
A F 35 Indian Counselling (12 
sessions), CBT for 
anxiety (20 
sessions) 
None Depression, additional 
unexplained 
somatic/physical 
complaints 
8 years 9 months (24 
sessions) 
B F 23 British Counselling 
x2,EMDR x2, TF-
CBT, Community 
Mental Health 
Team 
Citalopram, 
Quetiapine 
Depression, anxiety, 
personality disorder 
9 years 9 months (29 
sessions) 
C M 25 Indian Counselling, IAPT Not Available Depression 6 years 16 months (29 
sessions) 
D F 45 Spanish EMDR Citalopram, 
Mirtazapine, 
Diazepam 
Depression 7 years Six years four months 
(189 sessions) 
E F 29 Middle Eastern IAPT (20 sessions) None Depression 3 years 11 months (35 
sessions) 
F F 38 Irish IAPT and 
unspecified service 
(30 sessions total) 
Not Available Depression, anxiety 1 year 5 months (31 
sessions) 
X M 20 Bangladeshi None None Depression 11 years 6 months (8 sessions) 
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PTSD diagnosis was determined by the treating therapist through the use of routine 
measures such as the Posttraumatic Stress Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa, 1995), the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) and/or diagnostic 
interview techniques. The decision not to include a diagnostic tool  as part of the study 
was made for a number of reasons: (i) to minimise time pressure on 
participants/clinicians, (ii) to allow for a wider range of potential participants (all 
current clients could potentially be included at study commencement whereas use of a 
diagnostic tool would have minimised the participant pool to those entering the service 
after the date of study commencement) and (iii) to mirror, as closely as possible, those 
seeking treatment for PTSD across services in general. 
 
Participants who experienced intrusive images as part of their PTSD and who were 
willing to undergo ImRs as part of their treatment were included in the study. In 
addition to a diagnosis of PTSD, the following co-morbidities were also present in the 
sample: depression, anxiety, personality disorder and unexplained somatic complaints. 
While English was not required as a first language, those who required the use of an 
interpreter were excluded from the study. Further exclusion criteria were presence of a 
psychotic disorder, brain injury, current substance abuse or those with high risk of self-
harm or suicide. 
 
Recruitment. Sample size considerations were based on findings and 
suggestions from previous literature (Shadish & Sullivan, 2011; Shadish, Hedges & 
Pustejosky, 2014; Anrtz et al., 2013). The median number of cases used in SCEDs is 
three (Shadish et al., 2011). However, Shadish et al., (2014) argue that three cases will 
only yield power of .80, provided there is a minimum of 6 observations per phase and 
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an anticipated effect size (Cohen’s d – ‘d’) of 0.8. They recommend that, when d=0.5, 
power is adequate with 7 cases and 3 observations per phase. Arntz and colleagues 
suggest that ten cases would provide 80% power to detect a change of d=.1 or higher 
when paired t-tests are used to evaluate treatment effects when p=.05 (two-tailed) 
(Arntz et al., 2013). 
 
Phase lengths in the current study often consisted of less than six data points and 
participants were only followed for the duration of one image, making it likely that 
observed effect sizes would be small-moderate. Thus, the aim was to recruit a minimum 
of 10 participants. 
 
Recruitment was conducted at two outpatient National Health Services (NHS). The first 
service (Service 1), was a specialist trauma-focused CBT service. Treatment was 
carried out by three experienced clinical psychologists, all of whom had been 
specifically trained in ImRs and received regular supervision. Service 2 was an 
Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) Service. While not a specialist 
trauma service, this service treated trauma cases as part of their routine work. 
 
In total, nine participants agreed to take part. Of these, three dropped out before the first 
rescripting session. Two dropped out of ImRs in general – one because they did not like 
the sound of the approach and one because of an impending court case (thus delaying 
treatment onset). Another did not want the researcher to have access to any of their 
records. The six remaining participants were all from Service 1. 
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In addition to these six participants, one case (Participant X) from the archival sample, 
outlined in Phase 1, met the methodological criteria for this study and was also included 
as part of the current sample. This participant was seen at the first service described 
above. Thus, the final sample number was seven. Figure 1 depicts participant 
involvement. 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow diagram of participant recruitment. 
 
Ethics. Phase 2 involved further extending the ethics procedures outlined in 
Phase 1. An additional major amendment was made in order to amend the outcome 
measures used (approval granted on 08 September 2015). Approval was subsequently 
granted by RHUL-DEC and the relevant local R&D Departments. An additional 
recruitment site was added as part of Phase 2. Approval letters can be seen in 
Appendices 1-8. 
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Materials. Two types of measures were used during Phase 2. ‘Frequently 
Administered Measures’ were administered continuously across the course of the study. 
These consisted of Visual Analogue Scales (VASs) and were used due to their 
sensitivity to change across short time periods at the level of the individual. This is an 
essential component of the SCED as multiple baseline measures and continuous 
measures across the treatment phase is required. A copy of these measures can be seen 
in Appendices 11-13. 
 
‘Pre-/Post- Measures’ questionnaires were also administered once before and once after 
the intervention phase. These measures are less sensitive to small changes and tell us 
little about causal mechanisms of change, but can be useful in determining which 
participants have experienced reliable and significant change following an intervention 
(Morely, 2015b). A copy of these measures can be seen in Appendices 14-15. The two 
coding schemes from Phase 1 were also used. 
  
Frequently administered measures. 
Image Intrusiveness Visual Analogue Scales (IVAS). Image intrusiveness was 
rated using Brewin et al.’s (2009) self-report visual analogue scales (VASs). These 
scales ask participants to rate a particular image from 0-100 in relation to four 
constructs: frequency, level of interference with daily life, controllability and level of 
distress caused. A fifth scale, asking participants to rate how much it ‘feels as if their 
image is in the here and now’ (referred to as ‘nowness’) was added for the purpose of 
the current study. While these particular VASs, and the others discussed below, have 
not been validated, VASs are generally considered one of the simplest and quickest 
ways of measuring subjective experience (McCormack, de L. Horne, & Sheather, 
58 
 
1988), and have been shown to be both reliable and valid (Ahearn, 1997). They are 
sensitive to small changes within individuals and can be used to follow therapy 
processes over time (Morley, 2015a). 
 
Counterfactual Thinking Visual Analogue Scales (CTVAS). This measure was 
adapted from the interview schedule designed by El-Leithy et al., (2006) to measure 
counterfactual thinking in trauma victims. This measure consists of two VASs, ranging 
from 0-100, which measure frequency and level of distress in relation to specific 
counterfactual thoughts. 
 
Encapsulated Belief Visual Analogue Scale (EBVAS). This scale was adapted 
from interview methods designed for previous studies (Hackmann, Clark & McManus, 
2000; Wild & Clark, 2011). One VAS was used to measure participants’ level of belief 
in the key meaning related to a particular image on a scale of 0-100. 
 
Pre-/post- measures. 
Symptom Severity. In order to distinguish high- from low-responders, two of the 
previously mentioned IVAS subscales were combined and used to form a pre-/post- 
measure of Symptom Severity. The rationale for choosing these particular scales was 
due to the importance given to frequency and distress in the Clinician-Administered 
PTSD Scale (CAPS), which is considered the gold standard in PTSD assessment and 
has been extensively validated (PTSD: National Centre for PTSD, 2016; Weathers, 
Keane & Davidson, 2001). The latest version, the CAPS for DSM-5 (CAPS-5), was 
developed to reflect changes in diagnostic criteria within the DSM-5 and the extensive 
research supporting these changes. 
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While the CAPS has always used frequency and distress (referred to as intensity within 
the measure) to measure severity of symptoms, the CAPS-5 combines these two criteria 
into a single criterion such that PTSD symptom severity is measured based on a single 
rating that encompasses both frequency and distress. Thus, a single Frequency/Distress 
measure, henceforth called Symptom Severity, was thought to be the most salient 
criterion for use as a primary outcome, to distinguish high- and low-responders. 
 
Measure of Mundane Meaning (MMM) – Integration of Circumstances. The 
MMM (Brown, et al., 2008) contains 36 items designed to capture loss of personal 
meaning relative to a previous, higher level of functioning and has three subscales; 
Sense of Coherence, Integration of Circumstances and Sense of Purpose. Items have 
good internal consistency (α=.96) and subscales have adequate concurrent validity 
(r=.4-.64) with subscales of the World Assumptions Scale (WAS; Janoff-Bulman, 
1992), another measure of meaning. The Integration of Circumstances (IoC) subscale 
was used in the current study as a measure of how well participants had integrated the 
target intrusion into their life narrative. This scale consists of five items rated on a six-
point scale. Thus, IoC scores range between 0-30.  
 
Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale (CTNES) – Self-Referent 
counterfactual thinking (SRC). The CTNES (Rye, Cahoon, Ali & Daftary, 2008) was 
designed to measure counterfactual thinking in relation to a specific traumatic event 
and asks participants to rate 16 items on a likert scale (1-5). The CTNES consists of 
four subscales; Non-referent Downward, Other-referent Upward, Self-referent Upward 
and Non-referent Upward. In terms of validity, subscales of the CTNES have been 
shown to be positively correlated with constructs that are known to relate to 
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counterfactual thinking such as affect and cognitive style. Subscales are also sensitive 
to experimental manipulation concerning type of negative event. Because self-referent 
upward counterfactual thinking is the most common according to the literature (Davis 
et al., 1995) and is particularly linked to distress, reduced well-being and self-blame 
(Branscombe et al., 2003; Davis et al., 1995), the Self-Referent Upward counterfactual 
(SRC) subscale was chosen to determine pre- and post-ImRs rates of 
counterfactualising. The SRC consists of four items creating a range of scores from 4-
20. Each individual’s pre and post-score was reduced by 4 in order to create a scale of 
0-16. 
 
Coding schemes. The Session Content and GOS coding schemes outlined in 
Phase 1 were applied to recordings of ImRs sessions in Phase 2. 
 
Design. Treatment took place within the two outpatient services in London 
described above. This study, using a SCED, aimed to follow participants before, during 
and after rescripting of one image by using as naturalistic a design as possible, with 
minimal disruption to routine treatment. However, SCED requires a minimum of three 
baseline points as well as continuous measures across phases. Thus, some deviation in 
terms of type and frequency of measures was necessary. The treatment procedures 
themselves remained unaltered. 
 
Typically, trauma therapy starts with assessment, followed by imaginal exposure/re-
living and ending with ImRs. There are two difficulties associated with using SCED 
within these naturalistic treatment settings; (1) isolating the desired treatment 
component and (2) acquiring a stable baseline for cases that are already in therapy. In 
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an attempt to achieve this without disrupting routine treatment, collection of baseline 
measures was carried out over the period of one week. This allowed the minimum 
number of three data points to be collected between two sessions.  
 
Therefore, no treatment was administered during the baseline phase, making it more 
likely that a stable baseline would be achieved. Even though participants may have 
already benefited from previous treatment, it was hoped that a stable baseline could be 
achieved from this point on, allowing assessment of further changes brought about 
specifically by ImRs. This method of baseline collection also avoided interruption of 
routine treatment. Furthermore, the ‘Frequently Administered Measures’ all related 
specifically to the target image, rather than to PTSD symptoms or imagery qualities 
more generally. This was in an attempt to isolate, very specifically, a target for the 
SCED that minimised the impact of previous treatment. 
 
Initially, recruitment included only those moving from the imaginal exposures/re-living 
phase to the ImRs phase. These participants would not therefore have experienced 
rescripting prior to participation in the study. This was a further attempt to isolate a 
specific target for the SCED and to minimise the impact of previous treatment. 
However, due to the limited recruitment timeframe and in the interest of increasing the 
power of the study, this criterion was broadened to include participants who were 
already in the rescripting phase of treatment. 
 
Procedure. The study was introduced to potential participants by their treating 
clinician at any point during treatment up until one week prior to when rescripting 
commenced on the target image. If interested, they were given information sheets and 
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consent forms (Appendix 16). For those who consented, data collection began one week 
prior to rescripting of the target image (i.e., either when participants moved from the 
reliving to the rescripting phase of treatment, or when participants moved from one 
image to the next during the rescripting phase of treatment). 
 
‘Introduction’ session (one week prior to rescripting commencement). During 
this ‘Introduction’ session, patient and therapist worked together to identify the target 
image for rescripting. The elements described in the following sub-sections were then 
identified and rated in relation to the chosen image. In order to make sure that all 
measures were administered, participant folders were designed for each case. These 
folders provided optional scripts for therapists to identify the following elements, 
followed by the associated VASs. There was a separate section for each session of the 
study (One of the ImRs Session subsections is shown in Appendix 17 as an example). 
 
Image Intrusiveness. Image intrusiveness relating to the target image was 
measured using the IVAS (Frequency, Interference, Distress, Uncontrollability and 
‘Nowness’). 
 
Encapsulated Belief. In order to identify the encapsulated belief or ‘Key 
Meaning’ associated with the chosen image, participants were asked to close their eyes, 
get a clear image of the image/hotspot in their mind and describe it. They were 
encouraged to describe the event in the present tense, as though it was happening again. 
The therapist then worked with the participant, using Socratic questioning and 
downward arrow techniques, to determine the key meaning of the image. Examples of 
questions used to arrive at the encapsulated belief include: ‘What is the worst thing 
63 
 
about this memory?’ ‘What does it mean about you as a person?’ ‘What does it say 
about the world?’ ‘What is the most distressing/upsetting thing about this image?’ Once 
an appropriate encapsulated belief was agreed upon, it was written down and rated 
using the EBVAS. 
 
Counterfactual Thoughts. Participants were encouraged to identify up to three 
of the most common counterfactual thoughts in relation to the identified image. 
Examples of script prompts used to identify these thoughts include: ‘Many people often 
think about or imagine ways in which things might have turned out differently where 
the traumatic event is concerned. They may think about other ways that they might have 
behaved, things that other people might have done or they may imagine ways in which 
the circumstances of the event might have been different. These kinds of thoughts 
might begin with ‘what if’, ‘at least’ or ‘if only’.’ Once identified, these were written 
down and each was rated using the two scales on the CTVAS. 
 
Between sessions. The above ratings of the CTVAS, EBVAS and IVAS 
represent the first baseline point. Clients were asked to re-rate their image using these 
scales again during the following week (between sessions). This represents the second 
baseline point. Participants were also given the IoC and SRC (pre-/post- measures) to 
fill out between sessions. 
 
Imagery rescripting sessions. The CTVAS, EBVAS and IVAS were re-
administered again at the beginning of the following session (first ImRs session), 
representing the third baseline point. Participants then commenced re-scripting of their 
first image. All ImRs sessions were recorded for coding purposes. 
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Due to the naturalistic design, no specifications about particular types of ImRs were 
imposed on this study. However, the ImRs process used by therapists was generally 
based on approaches previously used by Arntz and Weertman (1999), Hackmann 
(1998), Smucker et al. (1995) and Smucker and Dancu (2005). Thus, participants first 
gave a detailed oral narrative of the chosen intrusive image. They were then asked what 
it was that they would like to change about the image. Assisted by the therapist, 
participants then created an alternative, vivid image that served to incorporate these 
changes. Therapists varied in the extent that they pre-prepared these changes, in the 
extent of prompting used to create change and in the extent to which the original image 
was first described. Participants were typically asked to practice bringing this 
alternative image to mind at home between sessions. 
 
Following rescripting, the IVAS, EBVAS and CTVAS (with the exception of scales 
relating to ‘frequency over the past 3 days’ & ‘interference with daily life over the past 
3 days’) were re-administered at the end of the session. Frequency and Interference 
scales were not re-administered because they relate to ‘the last three days’ and it would 
not make sense to rate such scales twice within the space of an hour. Thus, these scales 
were only administered once, before ImRs. All other VAS scales were administered 
both before and after ImRs. 
 
This procedure of rating the IVAS, EBVAS and CTVAS, carrying out rescripting and 
re-rating the measures again was continued across following rescripting sessions. In the 
interest of consistency across cases, participants were followed for a maximum of three 
sessions. Thus, each participant was followed for the duration of one image, up to a 
maximum of three sessions (range of 1-3 sessions). 
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Thus, for most measures during the treatment phase, there was a minimum of one and 
a maximum of five data points available. For measures relating to Frequency and 
Interference, there was a minimum of 0 and a maximum of two data points available 
for the treatment phase. Prolonging ImRs on the target image in order to obtain the ideal 
minimum of three data points per phase would not have been in the best interests of the 
client and, thus, was not imposed. 
 
Follow-up. When rescripting of the target image was complete (or after three 
ImRs sessions), participants completed the IVAS, EVAS and CTVAS one more time 
at the beginning of the following session as a follow-up data point. The IoC and SRC 
(pre-/post- measures) were also administered at this point. Once these measures had 
been completed, participants were given a Debrief Sheet (Appendix 18). In cases where 
this follow-up session involved no therapeutic work (e.g., discussions about therapy 
direction, practical tasks such as assistance with paperwork) a further set of IVAS, 
EBVAS and CTVAS measures were collected at the start of the following session. 
Study involvement was then terminated and participants continued treatment as usual. 
 
Participant X. Because Participant X (PX) was taken from the archival sample 
in Phase 1, there were some differences in Procedure. Firstly, no encapsulated belief or 
counterfactual thoughts were identified. Thus, PX only completed Image Intrusiveness 
measures. Pre-/post- measures were not administered as part of Phase 1 either. 
Furthermore, IVAS measures were collected only once per week at the start of sessions. 
Thus, the baseline was collected over a period of three weeks. Data was subsequently 
only collected at the start of each treatment session, before rescripting.  
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Coding. All session recordings were coded using the Session Content and GOS 
coding schemes. The Session Content coding scheme produced ten separate codes rated 
on an anchored scale between 0-3. The GOS coding scheme provided six codes rated 
between 1-3. Internal consistency of GOS codes has been found to be high (α >.9) in 
previous studies (Huddy et al., 2012; Keen et al., 2008), thus, an overall GOS score for 
each participant was obtained by summing the six individual scores. 
 
In order to create a GOS scale range of 0-12 (rather than 6-18 which resulted from each 
item being scored on a scale of 1-3), each total score was reduced by six points. For 
comparison purposes, resultant rescripts can be considered within different levels that 
increase in terms of simulation (1-4, 5-8 and 9-12). 
 
 Service-user perspective. The research protocol was presented to the service-
user group at Service 1 in order to determine its acceptability and to explore possible 
changes. Overall, the group reported that the protocol did not differ greatly from routine 
treatment with the exception of the ‘Between Sessions’ section, which involves 
bringing the target image to mind independently in order to rate the VAS scales. On the 
one hand, service-users thought that it might be ‘cathartic’ to have a written record of 
this information in order to track it over time. On the other hand, they were concerned 
that this might be too distressing to complete independently. All group members 
preferred the option of collecting all baseline measures during therapy sessions, even if 
this meant delaying ImRs onset by one week. 
 
Unfortunately, the majority of the current participants had already completed baseline 
measures by the time this meeting took place and there was insufficient time to make 
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the necessary ethical amendments within the current recruitment timeframe. However, 
this study is expected to be an ongoing process within Service 1 and ethical permission 
will be sought to make the necessary amendments for future participants. 
 
Other issues discussed included the point at which it would be most appropriate to 
partake in the study and whether or not it should be compulsory for the researcher to 
meet with/talk to participants. Service-users felt that participation in the study would 
be more acceptable later in the process, rather than at the start of rescripting. This option 
was already being investigated as an attempt to widen recruitment and was 
subsequently incorporated into the study. Group members were happy with the current 
protocol stipulating that the decision of whether participants have direct contact with 
the research lies with each individual participant. 
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Results 
Phase 1 
Phase 1 analysis involved assessing the inter-rater reliability of the two coding schemes. 
Interclass-correlations were used to assess reliability and, according to convention, an 
intraclass correlation coefficient of > 0.7 was considered an acceptable level of 
agreement. 
 
Session Content coding scheme. Six cases (100% of sample), encompassing a 
total of 18 sessions were coded by two researchers. Discrepancies greater than one point 
were only seen in 2.1% of the ratings. The inter-class correlation between the two raters 
was .81, indicating an acceptable level of agreement (>.7). 
 
GOS coding scheme. One session from three cases (50% sample, 17% of 
sessions) were coded by two researchers. Ratings were never discrepant by more than 
one point. The inter-class correlation between the two raters was .78, indicating an 
acceptable level of agreement. 
 
Phase 2 
An overview of findings across the entire sample is presented. This is followed by 
individual analysis of each participant in order to provide a more detailed analysis of 
links between outcomes and codes. 
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Table 4. 
Symptom Severity, IoC and SRC Scores Before and After ImRs. 
 
P Symptom Severity 
Before 
Symptom Severity 
After 
SRC 
Before 
SRC 
After 
IoC 
Before 
IoC 
After 
A 91.67 52.5 14 10 8 4 
B 46.67 5 7 0 4 14 
C 81.67 60 10 10 10 21 
D 61.67 17.5 - - 8 15 
E 68.33 35 12 2 17 23 
F 65 55 4 6 5 6 
X 60 50 - - - - 
Note. SRC – Self-Referent Counterfactual Thinking Subscale of the Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events (CTNES) questionnaire 
(range: 0-16). IoC – Integration of Circumstances subscale of the Measure of Mundane Meaning (MMM) questionnaire (range: 0-30).  
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Sample overview. Table 4 above provides a summary of pre- and post- outcome 
measures for all participants. Analyses were carried out in order to divide participants 
into high- and low- responders. Following this, high- and low-responders were 
compared in terms of coding patterns and outcome measures. 
 
Identifying high- and low-responders. The Symptom Severity measure 
(combination of Frequency & Distress) was used to identify those who experienced 
statistically reliable and clinically significant changes following rescripting.  
 
Jacobson and Traux (1991) provide the following formula for calculating a reliable 
change index (RCI): RCI = M1 – M2 / SEdiff. Each subject’s post-ImRs score was 
subtracted from their pre-ImRs score and divided by the Standard Error of Difference. 
The SEdiff was calculated as √(1-r) where r is the test-retest reliability of the measure in 
question. Using Kendall’s r, and based on each participant’s first two baseline points, 
test-retest reliability was calculated as .51, providing a SEdiff of 14.65. An RCI above 
1.96 can be considered indicative of statistically reliable change (Jacobson & Traux, 
1991). 
 
In addition to calculating reliable change, a further calculation for clinically significant 
change, defined as at least two standard deviations above/below the pre-ImRs sample 
mean (Jacobson & Traux, 1991; Veale, Page, Woodward & Salkovskis, 2015) was 
conducted. This formula produced a cut-off point of 38 for Symptom Severity. For all 
calculations, pre-ImRs data was based on the average of each participant’s three 
baseline scores. For post-ImRs scores, most participants only had one follow-up point. 
When more than one was available, the average score was obtained. 
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Comparing high- and low-responders. Four participants (PA, PB, PD and PE) 
met criteria for reliable change. Of these, three (PB, PD and PE) also met criteria for 
clinically significant change. Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of participants’ pre- and post-
Symptom Severity scores and indicates those who met criteria for reliable and/or 
clinically significant change. 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatter plot of pre- and post-Symptom Severity scores 
 
Session Content and GOS coding. High- and low-responders were compared in 
terms of the two coding schemes. For participants who had more than one rescripting 
session, summary scores were computed by averaging codes across sessions 
(summarised in Table 5). Darker shading represents a higher rating for a given code. 
Participants are listed in order of Symptom Severity change. Due to the small sample 
size, statistical comparison of high- and low-responders was deemed inappropriate. 
Thus, further analysis is based on descriptive observation only. 
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All high-responders’ rescripts were rated as well-simulated across sessions while low-
responders’ rescript ratings were in the less coherent range. With the exception of 
Participant D (PD), an overall trend could also be observed whereby increases in GOS 
and increases in Symptom Severity change were linked in a roughly linear manner. 
 
In terms of Session Content, the clearest observed difference was for activation of new 
processes. All high-responders were rated as having incorporated very intense 
emotions, cognitions and/or physical sensations within the rescripted imagery, while 
low-responders’ new processes were rated as less intense. Apparent differences can also 
be seen for cognitive/emotional shift, therapist guidance and rescript believability.  
High-responders were rated as showing evidence of experiencing higher levels of 
cognitive/emotional shift while low-responders tended to experience lower levels of 
shift. A similar pattern can be seen for rescript believability with higher belief ratings 
ascribed to high-responders and lower belief ratings ascribed to low-responders. Low-
responders also required more overall therapist guidance than high-responders. 
 
Less pronounced differences were observed for timing of change in ImRs. All high-
responders incorporated change during the original imagery while 2/3 low-responders 
chose to introduce change immediately before the event. Less clear differences were 
also observable for new imagery activation. High-responders’ new imagery elements 
tended to be rated as a bit more vivid than low-responders’. 
 
There were no pronounced patterns for the remaining codes. Although less clear-cut, 
original imagery activation ratings showed the opposite pattern to new imagery 
activation, with original imagery elements rated as marginally less vivid for high-
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responders, relative to low-responders. In terms of image departure, all participants but 
one incorporated some original but mostly new imagery elements. PX, who responded 
least to ImRs, included some new but mostly original imagery. In terms of processes 
relating to the original imagery, mean scores for high- and low-responders were similar. 
However, low-responder’s original processes were rated as either very intense or 
minimally intense, while high-responders’ original processes fell more within the 
middle range of intensity ratings. No differences were observed in ability to stay 
connected to the imagery during rescripting. All participants were rated as being able 
to stay with the imagery throughout. 
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Table 5. 
Participant GOS and Session Content Ratings across All ImRs Sessions. 
P Symptom 
Severity 
Change 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
D -44.2 8.7 2 3 3 2.7 1.3 2.7 1.7 2.7 1.7 1.7 
B -41.7 12 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 
A -39.2 9 2 3 3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.3 3 2.7 2.7 
E -33.3 9 2 3 3 2 1.5 3 1.5 3 3 2.5 
C -21.7 7 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
F -10 7 2 2 3 1 1 3 0 2 2 2 
X -10 5 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 
HR Mean: 9.68 2 3 3 2.5 2.13 2.75 1.63 2.93 2.6 2.48 
LR Mean: 6.33 1.67 2.33 3 1.67 2.33 2.33 1.33 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Note. High-responders are above the thick horizontal line and low-responders are below. Mean codes for high- and low-responders are represented at the bottom of the 
table. GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3. Darker shading represents higher levels/categories across codes. For GOS, simulation was 
divided into three levels, 1-4, 5-8, 9-12. 
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Counterfactual thinking and global meaning. Cut-off points (rounded to nearest 
whole number) for clinically significant change (Jacobson & Traux, 1991) were 
calculated for the SRC and IoC. To meet criteria, post-ImRs scores had to be below 2 
on the SRC and above 18 on the IoC. Table 6 shows level of change in SRC and IoC 
outcome measures for each participant. Scores that met criteria for clinically significant 
change are highlighted in bold. PX, the archival participant, was omitted from these 
analyses as they did not complete SRC or IoC measures. PD was omitted from the SRC 
analyses as she declined to complete this measure. Comparing high- and low-
responders statistically was deemed inappropriate due to the small sample size. Thus, 
subsequent analysis is based on descriptive observation. 
 
Table 6. 
Level of Change for SRC and IoC, and Mean GOS Scores for each Participant. 
P Symptom Severity 
Change 
GOS Rating SRC IoC 
D -44.2 8.7 - +7 
B -41.7 12 -7 +10 
A -39.2 9 -3 -4 
E -33.3 9 -10* +6 
C -21.7 7 0 +11 
F -10 7 +2 +1 
Note. High-responders are above the horizontal line and low-responders are below. 
Participants are listed in order of Symptom Severity change experienced. Scores 
highlighted in bold represent those that meet criteria for clinically significant change. 
An * marks scores that fall on the cut-off point. 
 
 
76 
 
As can be seen from Table 6, all high-responders experienced some level of decline in 
self-referent counterfactualising with two of these meeting criteria for clinically 
significant change. Low-responders experienced no change or an increase in scores. 
There was no overlap in scores between high- and low-responders. In terms of GOS, 
well-simulated rescripting was linked to declines in SRC and less well-simulated 
rescripting was linked to no change or increasing scores. However, GOS ratings did not 
seem to link to decreases in SRC scores in a linear fashion, as had been predicted. 
 
IoC scores were less clear. All but one participant experienced some increase in 
meaning scores. However, there did not seem to be any differences between high- and 
low-responders. Two participants met criteria for clinically significant change – one 
was a low-responder while the other fell just above the high-responder cut off. Thus, 
no obvious relationship between ImRs efficacy and change in meaning can be seen, nor 
did there appear to be a relationship between GOS and change in IoC scores. 
 
Individual analysis. Demographic information was presented previously in 
Table 3. For each participant, further background information is presented, followed by 
graphical analysis of outcome measures and a summary of the Session Content and 
GOS codes. 
 
Analysis plan. A recent document on SCEDs outlined the steps necessary for 
effective visual analysis of data (Kratochwill et al., 2010). The first step is to determine 
whether the baseline is consistent enough to be used to assess intervention effects. The 
second step is to assess the level, trend and variability of data within each phase and to 
compare these observed patterns across phases in order to consider whether patterns 
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change across phases. This process can be further supplemented, where necessary, 
through the use of comparing overlap and immediacy of effect. 
 
There is debate in the literature about whether visual analysis of graphs in SCEDs is 
sufficient (Barlow, Nock & Herson, 2009; Morely, 2015) or whether statistical analysis 
is necessary (e.g., Kazdin, 2007; Parker, Vannest, Davis & Sauber 2011; Shadish, 
2014), although there is generally consensus that conventional parametric statistics are 
inappropriate due to the associated threats to validity (Shadish, Rindskopf, Hedges & 
Sullivan 2013). One instance where statistical analysis of SCED data may be called for 
beyond visual analysis is in cases where baseline data is unstable (Morley, 2015; Parker 
et al., 2011), especially when longer phases are available. 
 
Table 7. 
Explanation of Key Terms used within Graphical Analysis. 
Key Term Explanation 
Median Number in the middle of the data when data is rank 
ordered. If there is an even number of data points, then the 
median is estimated by calculating the average of the 
middle two data points. 
Broadened Median 
(BMED) 
The average of the three middle values when data are rank 
ordered. 
Running Median of 2 
(RM2) 
Average of successive sets of 2 data points throughout the 
phase 
Trended Range (TR) Lines connecting the highest and lowest values in each 
half of the phase – depicts change in variability across 
time. 
 
Based on the relevant literature, the following plan was established. Definitions of key 
terms used in this section can be found in Table 7 above. Central tendency, trend and 
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variability were calculated for all VAS measures. Various methods were used to 
calculate these parameters depending on phase length (Morley, 2015; Morley & Adams, 
1991). Table 8 summarises the calculations used and the manner in which these are 
presented within the graphs. Phases are separated by vertical solid lines. Graphs 
depicting central tendency and trend are presented within each participant subsection 
and graphs showing trended range can be seen in Appendices 19-25. 
 
Table 8. 
Calculations used for Central Tendency, Trend and Variability. 
Measures of Central Tendency – Dashed Line 
Phase Length Method Used Represented Graphically by 
1 Data points only (no line) Round dots 
2-4 Median Dashed line 
5+ Broadened Median 
(BMED) 
Dashed line 
Trend in Phase Data – Dotted Line 
Phase Length Method Used Represented Graphically by 
1-2 Data points only (no line) Round dots 
3+ Running Mean of 2 
(RM2) 
Dotted line 
Variability within Phases – Solid Lines 
Phase Length Method Used Represented Graphically by 
1-2 Data points only (no line) Diamond shaped dots 
3+ Trended Range Solid black lines 
 
According to Gast and Spriggs (2010), baseline stability can be assumed when 80% of 
the phase data falls within a 20% range of the median. Due to the small number of data 
79 
 
points available, a conservative approach to baseline stability was used with stability 
being assumed only when all phase data points fell within a 20% range of the median. 
 
In cases where baseline data was unstable and there was a minimum of three data points 
in both baseline and treatment phases, Tau-U analysis was carried out. This is a 
statistical analysis that controls for trend in baseline and assesses level of overlap in 
data between phases simultaneously (Parker et al., 2011). In cases where less than three 
data points were available in either phase, statistical analysis was deemed inappropriate. 
In these cases, the source of variability is discussed in so far as is possible (Kratochwill 
et al., 2010) and cautious visual analysis is carried out (See Figure 3 for a summary). 
 
 
Figure 3. Flow chart for use of statistical means of baseline control. 
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Participant A. Table PA1 shows PA’s rescript details. PA spoke English as a 
first language, had experienced multiple traumas in life and met criteria for complex 
PTSD. She was experiencing significant dissociation and ongoing legal difficulties at 
the time of treatment. 
 
Table PA1. 
Target Image, Encapsulated Belief, Counterfactual Thoughts and Chosen Rescript for 
PA. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
Held at gun 
point in 
domestic 
violence 
situation. 
Perpetrator 
known to 
participant. 
‘I was 
helpless and 
defeated and 
that means I 
am weak.’ 
1 ‘If only I didn’t go 
in there, then this 
s*** wouldn’t have 
happened.’ 
 
2 ‘If only I had kept 
my mouth shut 
about my relation to 
him, this wouldn’t 
have happened.’ 
 
3 ‘If only there had 
been a back-up 
there. The police 
should have sent 
someone. If only 
someone was 
guiding and 
supporting me.’ 
1st session – martial arts 
used to gain control of gun 
and physically attack 
perpetrator. 
 
2nd session – verbally 
berated perpetrator and 
forced him to leave. Set 
scene of trauma alight and 
teleported police into the fire 
before zapping them with a 
magical weapon and going 
to safe place. 
 
3rd session – used 
superpowers to transform 
gun. Cleansed soul of 
perpetrator with help of 
magical creature before 
zapping him away. Sought 
revenge on police for not 
aiding her. Verbally berated 
them, physically assaulted 
them and squashed them 
with a magic machine. Went 
to safe space with magical 
creature. 
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Three baseline points were available for PA, followed by three rescripting sessions and 
two follow-up data points. PA had not completed rescripting of the target image and 
work continued following study involvement. Baseline data across all measures with 
the exception of Uncontrollability was either increasing or within a 20% range of the 
median and thus deemed to be stable. Statistical analyses were used with regard to 
Uncontrollability baseline instability. Image Intrusiveness, Encapsulated Belief and 
Counterfactual Thought VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures PA1-5, Figure 
PA6 and Figures PA7-12 respectively. GOS and Session Content codes are summarised 
in Table PA2.
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Figure PA1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend          
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (----) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PA5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure PA6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Figure PA7. CF1-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (---) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA9. CF2-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA8. CF1-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA10. CF2-Distress VAS raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PA11. CF3-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PA12. CF3-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ)
 
Table PA2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PA. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
9 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 
8 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 
10 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. Sessions 1 and 3 were 
well-simulated, while session two fell just below this cut-off and was less well-
simulated. As can be seen from the coding summary, all sessions contained some 
original imagery of the trauma, but mostly new, rescripted imagery. Change was always 
introduced during the image, including the worst point, and PA did not have any 
difficulties staying with the imagery. The first session was rated as mostly self-guided 
but therapist guidance increased thereafter in order to facilitate more vivid and detailed 
descriptions within the imagery. 
 
For the first session, both original trauma elements and new imagery elements were 
rated as moderately activated. These ratings increased across sessions such that, by the 
last session, PA was rated as visualising all imagery very vividly. PA was rated as 
experiencing high activation of original trauma emotions (fear/anger), thoughts (‘How 
dare you?’) and physical sensations (pain, body temperature) for the first two sessions. 
This intensity increased during the final session. Emotions (reduced fear, relief, pride), 
thoughts (‘He’s pathetic’, sense of authority and power) and physical sensations (body 
relaxing) associated with new imagery elements were rated as very highly activated 
across all sessions.  Associated level of cognitive/emotional shift and level of belief in 
the rescript were both rated as shifting from high to medium and back to high. 
 
In terms of outcome, these factors were followed by a delayed decrease in Frequency 
and Interference (follow-up). For the remaining Image Intrusiveness measures and 
Level of Belief, some changes in scores occurred during the treatment phase. However, 
a stable and continued decrease in scores was not achieved for most measures. 
Uncontrollability, in particular, also showed significant baseline trend. Non-overlap 
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analysis showed that differences between baseline and treatment fell short of 
significance, TAUb = -.87 (p = .05), Confidence Intervals (CI): -1.6<>-.13. Generally 
speaking, these measures showed a pattern in variability whereby scores decreased 
notably from the start to end of a session, followed by a subsequent increase by the 
beginning of the following session. This variability generally decreased across the 
treatment phase to some extent. However, scores generally increased at follow-up. 
 
In terms of counterfactual thinking, the largest changes in Distress across all 
counterfactuals were seen in Session 3 which was the only session that was both well-
simulated and rescripted fully in-line with one of PA’s main counterfactual beliefs. 
Changes were also seen during Session 2, which was moderately well-simulated and 
partially in-line with CF3. However, session specific changes were found for CF1 and 
CF2, even though they were not incorporated into the rescript. Despite large decreases 
in scores within certain sessions, overall, gains from baseline to follow-up for most 
counterfactual measures were small. Counterfactual frequency data were less variable. 
No changes were seen in CF1. CF2 Frequency remained high and stable across the 
treatment phase but dropped at follow-up with a downward trend. CF3 central tendency 
decreased from baseline to treatment and was maintained at follow-up. 
 
Participant B Table PB1 shows PB’s rescript details. PB spoke English as a 
first language. She had experienced multiple traumas and suffered from physical 
disabilities relating to her trauma history. The image in question related to a medical 
procedure carried out in relation to an intensive care unit (ICU) admission. 
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Table PB1. 
Target Image, Encapsulated Belief, Counterfactual Thoughts and Chosen Rescript for 
PB. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
Medical 
procedure 
carried out by a 
nurse without 
sedation in the 
context of an 
ICU admission. 
‘I am 
worthless.’ 
‘If only I’d been 
sedated.’ 
 
‘If only someone 
had stepped in.’ 
 
‘If only she’d 
talked to me.’ 
(nurse) 
PB instigated 
conversation with nurse 
that resulted in sedation 
prior to the procedure. 
Image also changed such 
that nurse was more 
friendly and reassuring 
and offered an 
explanation of the 
procedure as it 
progressed. 
 
Three baseline data points are available for PB, followed by one session of rescripting 
and one follow-up session. Rescripting work on the target image was deemed to be 
complete at this time. Because PB only had one rescripting session, there is no treatment 
phase data for any of the Frequency or Interference measures. All remaining measures 
contain one data point during the treatment phase. There was a gap of three weeks 
between the second and third baseline points. For all measures, there is an obvious 
increase in variability and downward trend across the baseline phase. Data did not meet 
criteria for stability for any of the measures. Statistical analysis was not deemed 
appropriate due to limited treatment phase data. 
 
Interestingly, PB reported that, after completing measures for the second baseline point, 
she spontaneously started to rescript the image independently. For all measures, the 
first two baseline points either met stability criteria or increased. This was followed by 
a significant decrease in scores for baseline point 3, when spontaneous rescripting 
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occurred. This will be taken into account during the following sections. However, it 
renders analysis difficult because, if the third baseline point is considered as potentially 
falling more within the rescripting phase, only two baseline points are then available, 
making it impossible to assume stability. Thus, the following analysis must be viewed 
with caution and any findings are tentative. Image Intrusiveness, Encapsulated Belief 
and Counterfactual Thought VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures PB1-5, 
Figure PB6 and Figures PB7-14 respectively. GOS and Session Content codes are 
summarised in Table PB2.
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Figure PB1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (---------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ) 
 
Figure PB3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ x ˑ ˑ). 
Figure PB2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PB4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ 
ˑ). 
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Figure PB5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
Figure PB6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Figure PB7. CF1-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PB9. CF2-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PB8. CF1-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PB10. CF2-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PB11. CF3-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
Figure PB12. CF3-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Table PB2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PB. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
12 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. PB received maximum 
scores across all simulation codes. Rescripting consisted of mostly new, rescripted 
imagery and some original imagery elements. Change was introduced during the image, 
although the worst moment was not included. PB was able to stay with the imagery 
throughout and imagery was mostly self-guided. 
 
Both original and new, rescripted imagery elements were rated as very vivid and intense 
with many of the senses experienced very clearly. PB appeared to experience low 
activation of emotions (anxiety), thoughts and physical sensations (tired, cold) 
associated with the original image. However, new emotions (e.g., relief, happiness, 
reassured), cognitions (‘looking forward to it being over’, ‘will miss it – it has been a 
big part of my life’) and physical sensations (e.g., relaxed, strange/ticklish-sensation) 
associated with change in the imagery were rated as very highly activated. Ratings 
suggest that the resultant rescript was associated with a high level of change in meaning 
and was experienced as completely believable. 
 
While the largest decrease in scores across measures tended to take place at the end of 
the Baseline phase (i.e., spontaneous rescripting), a further decrease in scores for all 
Image Intrusiveness and Encapsulated Belief measures occurred during the following 
phase. Furthermore, there was no overlap in scores between baseline and treatment 
phases, and gains were either maintained or showed further improvement at follow-up. 
PB rescripted in-line with all three of her counterfactuals. Taking spontaneous 
rescripting into account, ImRs was followed by a sustained decrease in Frequency and 
Distress of all counterfactuals. 
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However, caution is required with regard to PB’s results due to the substantial 
variability and downward baseline trend. On the one hand, this trend is likely due to the 
spontaneous rescripting that occurred at the end of the baseline phase. This is supported 
by the fact that the first two baseline points across all measures were either stable or 
increased. On the other hand, there are two remaining reasons for caution. Firstly, two 
data points is not enough to assume phase stability. Secondly, no coding exists for the 
rescripting that took place independently, making it harder to draw conclusions about 
links between the above identified codes and outcome measures. 
 
Participant C. Table PC1 shows PC’s rescript details. PC spoke English as a 
second language without the need for an interpreter. PC had experienced sustained and 
multiple traumas as an adult and was experiencing asylum issues and significant social 
isolation at the time of treatment. 
 
Table PC1. 
Target Image, Encapsulated Belief, Counterfactual Thoughts and Chosen Rescript for 
PC. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual Thoughts Rescript 
Being forced 
into oral rape 
with a prison 
guard. 
‘It was unfair.’ ‘I wish I could have 
pushed him away or 
punched his face.’ 
 
‘If only I’d kept my 
mouth shut.’ 
 
‘If only he hadn’t come 
on his own.’ 
PC sought revenge 
on perpetrator by 
physically attacking 
him. Rescript 
continued such that 
PC was able to leave 
prison via legal 
proceedings. 
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Three baseline points are available for PC, followed by one session of rescripting and 
two follow-up points. PC felt that he had done sufficient work on the image following 
one session of rescripting and no further image work was planned. Thus, there is no 
treatment phase data available for any Frequency or Interference measures. All 
remaining measures contain one data point during treatment.  Baseline data for all 
measures, with the exception of Nowness, either met criteria for stability or showed an 
increase in trend. Due to the lack of sufficient treatment phase data, Tau-U analysis was 
not applied to Nowness data. Thus, particular caution is necessary when interpreting 
Nowness results. Image Intrusiveness, Encapsulated Belief and Counterfactual Thought 
VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures PC1-5, Figure PC6 and Figures PC7-
12 respectively. GOS and Session Content codes are summarised in Table PC2. 
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Figure PC1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-------) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PC3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PC2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PC4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (---) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PC5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure PC6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Figure PC7. CF1-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PC9. CF2-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (---) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PC8. CF1-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PC10. CF2-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PC11. CF3-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PC12. CF3-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Table PC2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PC. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
7 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 1 
 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. PC’s rescript fell within 
the moderate GOS range. It contained some original, trauma-related elements, but 
mostly consisted of new imagery. Change was introduced during the original image, 
although the worst moment was not included.  PC was able to stay with the imagery 
throughout the session although some therapist guidance was necessary to facilitate 
more vivid and detailed descriptions. 
 
Original trauma-imagery elements were rated as very vivid while new, rescripted 
elements were rated as moderately vivid. Original and new internal processes were both 
given low intensity ratings. Processes associated with the trauma included emotions 
(fear) and thoughts (‘might get beaten up’). During rescripted imagery, while PC still 
experienced some fear, he also experienced relief and happiness. New thoughts (‘life is 
changeable’, ‘glad that it is being done by the books’) were also present. Ratings 
indicated that PC experienced a low level of cognitive/emotional shift and that the 
rescript was only somewhat believable.  
 
In terms of Imagery Intrusiveness, the most consistent and stable change were found 
for Frequency, Interference and Uncontrollability, all of which showed small but clear 
decreases in central tendency across treatment and follow-up. Data variability and 
baseline instability for Distress and especially Nowness made it difficult to draw any 
concrete conclusions about lasting change. No change in Level of Belief in the 
encapsulated belief occurred. 
 
In terms of counterfactual thinking, moderate simulation levels co-occurred with 
changes in Frequency for all three counterfactuals. Only CF1, which was incorporated 
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into the rescript, continued to decrease further across follow-up. However, there were 
no difference between counterfactuals in terms of Distress, with all three showing some 
evidence of a decrease in central tendency during treatment followed by subsequent 
increases and variability at follow-up, making conclusions about stable change difficult. 
Caution in interpretation is required due to the limited treatment phase data, especially 
for Frequency and Interference data, for which no treatment phase data was available. 
 
Participant D. Table PD1 shows PD’s rescript details. PD could not identify 
any particularly strong counterfactual beliefs associated with her image. Thus, no 
counterfactual measures were completed. Although it was not her first language, 
sessions were conducted in English. PD had experienced an eight-year period of 
domestic abuse. During Session 3, PD reported awaiting results of a potentially serious 
health condition. 
 
Table PD1. 
Target image, Encapsulated Belief, and Chosen Rescript for PD. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
Being 
verbally and 
physical 
abused by 
husband. 
‘As a human 
being, I am 
extinguished 
and dead’ 
- Fictional characters brought 
into rescript to physically 
intimidate and verbally 
berate perpetrator, before 
comforting PD. Characters 
and PD then travel to a safe 
space and engage in pleasant 
activities. 
 
Three baseline points are available for PD, followed by three rescripting sessions and 
one follow-up point. Work on the target image was then considered complete. Due to 
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the fact that PD was approaching the end of her treatment within the service, sessions 
were conducted every second week. Thus, there was a gap of two weeks between 
treatment session and before follow-up. Baseline data for all measures, except 
Interference, met criteria for stability. Due to limited treatment phase data, Tau-U 
analyses were not conducted in relation to Interference. Image Intrusiveness and 
Encapsulated Belief VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures PD1-5 and Figure 
PD6 respectively. GOS and Session Content codes are summarised in Table PD2.
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Figure PD1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PD3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ 
ˑ). 
 
Figure PD2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (----) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PD4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ 
ˑ). 
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Figure PD5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
Figure PD6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Table PD2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PD. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
7 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 
10 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 
9 2 3 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 2 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. Session 2 and 3 were well-
simulated relative to Session 1 which was less well-simulated. Interestingly, at the end 
of Session 2, PD spontaneously remarked that she had found the rescripting process 
easier than she had during the previous week as it ‘felt more coherent’ this time. Session 
1 was described as ‘jumping from one bit to the next more’, making it more difficult to 
follow. PD used some original trauma-imagery but mostly new image elements across 
sessions. Change was introduced during the image, including the worst point. PD did 
not have any difficulties staying with the imagery and progressed from moderately self-
guided to mostly self-guided rescripting.  
 
Original trauma imagery was rated as somewhat to moderately vivid while new imagery 
was rated more vividly. Ratings of original emotions (fear), thoughts (‘I am emotionally 
non-existent’) and physical sensations (paralysed) decreased in intensity across 
sessions. Ratings of new emotions (feel ‘good’, laughs during rescript) and thoughts 
(‘My appetite for life hasn’t completely died’) associated with the rescript, increased 
from highly to very highly activated by the end of rescripting. Ratings for 
cognitive/emotional shift and level of belief in the rescript both increased across 
sessions. 
  
In terms of outcome, graphs show a clear but small decrease in Frequency and more 
pronounced decreases in Level of Belief in the encapsulated belief. Decreases in 
Interference cannot be attributed to ImRs onset due to significant baseline variability. 
Remaining measures showed consistent decreases during treatment but graphical 
analyses show similar rates of decline to baseline. Despite meeting baseline stability 
criteria, the Tau-U analysis was carried out (Table PD3). Gains made in treatment for 
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Distress and Nowness fell just short of significance, which may partially reflect lack of 
power due to limited number of data points. Distress, in particular, shows the greatest 
decrease in scores at treatment onset. Uncontrollability changes at treatment were not 
significant. 
 
Table PD3. 
Tau-U analysis for Distress, Nowness and Uncontrollability for PD. 
 TAUb P Value CI 90% 
Distress -.8 .07 -1.54<>-.06 
Nowness -.8 .07 -1.54<>-.06 
Uncontrollability -.62 .18 -1.54<>-.14 
 
Due to the fact that PD was at the end of over 200 sessions of treatment, it is possible 
that a certain level of spontaneous rescripting occurred during the baseline due to PD’s 
familiarity with the technique. With this in mind, a sizeable and steady decrease in 
scores was found. However, due to the absence of coding during the baseline and lack 
of stability, it is difficult to make concrete links between specific codes and outcome. 
That said, it is also notable that scores did not increase towards the end of the treatment 
phase when PD reported experiencing a considerable amount if distress in relation to a 
potentially serious health scare. 
 
Participant E. Table PE1 shows PE’s rescript details. PE’s trauma related to the 
experience of carrying out aid work in a war zone. English was spoken as a first 
language. PE had experienced one isolated trauma. 
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Table PE1. 
Target Image, Encapsulated Belief, Counterfactual Thoughts and Chosen Rescript for 
PE. 
Target 
Image 
Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
Went back 
to get 
forgotten 
item. In the 
lift. Soldier 
trying to 
get into the 
lift. Feeling 
trapped.  
‘I am 
helpless and 
powerless. I 
can’t cope.’ 
‘If only I hadn’t 
left the bag 
behind, this 
wouldn’t have 
happened.’ 
 
‘If only I was able 
to think and act 
more quickly.’ 
 
‘What if they 
catch me and get 
me?’ 
1st Session – PE changed the 
image such that she used a 
magical sword of power in order 
to safely escape the war zone 
with her team as well as using its 
power to protect the people 
living in the area. 
 
2nd Session – As above but this 
time PE let the soldiers almost 
catch her before using the sword 
to stop and disarm them. 
 
Three baseline points were available for PE, followed by two rescripting sessions and 
one follow-up point. PE did not plan to carry out further rescripting work on this image. 
Baseline data for Nowness, Level of Belief and all three Counterfactual Distress 
measures failed to meet stability criteria. Tau-U analysis was carried out for these 
measures (Table PE3). All other measures met baseline stability criteria. Image 
Intrusiveness, Encapsulated Belief and Counterfactual Thought VAS scales are 
graphically displayed in Figures PE1-5, Figure PE6 and Figures PE7-12 respectively. 
GOS and Session Content codes are summarised in Table PE2. 
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Figure PE1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PE3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PE2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (---) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ 
ˑ). 
 
Figure PE4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (----) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PE5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure PE6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Figure PE7. CF1-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PE9. CF2-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PE8. CF1-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PE10. CF2-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5
C
F1
 -
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Measurement
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5
C
F2
 -
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
Measurement
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C
F1
 -
D
is
tr
es
s
Measurement
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C
F2
 -
D
is
tr
es
s
Measurement
112 
 
 
Figure PE11. CF3-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PE12. CF3-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Table PE2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PE. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
6 2 3 3 1 1 3 1 3 3 2 
12 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 
 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. GOS ratings increased 
from lower to maximum simulation levels across sessions. It was noted that while the 
actual rescript in Session 1 was well-simulated, this was largely due to therapist input, 
resulting in lower scores across all six GOS codes. Some original but mostly new 
imagery elements were used across sessions. Change was introduced during the image, 
including the worst point. PE had no difficulty staying with the image. Original, trauma 
related-imagery was given lower vividness ratings, while new imagery elements were 
consistently rated as very vivid. Therapist prompting was initially necessary to support 
this level of imagery activation before PE was able to do so independently. 
 
A similar pattern was seen for internal processes. Lower ratings were given to emotions 
(guilt, feeling of doom) thoughts (‘I’m going to die in this lift’) and physical sensations 
(shaky/shuddering, tired) associated with original trauma-imagery, while new emotions 
(relief, gladness), thoughts (‘I’m not trapped’, ‘I can do this’) and physical sensations 
(energy, lightness) were rated as very high across sessions. Rescript believability 
ratings went from mostly to completely believable while cognitive/emotional shift was 
rated as consistently high. 
 
In terms of Image Intrusiveness, the clearest and most consistent change was found for 
Distress which showed a large decrease that was maintained at follow-up. While initial 
clear decreases in Frequency and Interference occurred, these were not maintained at 
follow-up. Thus, while PE was still thinking of the image frequently and it was still 
interfering to a certain extent with daily life following rescripting, it no longer appeared 
to be creating distress. No concrete conclusions could be drawn about Nowness and 
Uncontrollability due to variability and baseline trend (see Table PE3 for Tau-U 
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analyses). A clearer, but non-significant decline in Level of Belief in the encapsulated 
belief was observed. 
 
Table PE3. 
Tau-U analysis for Nowness, Level of Belief and Counterfactual Distress for PE. 
 TAUb P Value CI 90% 
Nowness -.35 .51 -1.17<>.5 
Level of Belief -.78 .13 -.16<>.06 
CF1-Distress -.67 .19 -1.5<>.17 
CF2-Distress -1.11 .03 -1.95<>-.27 
CF3-Distress -.78 .13 -1.62<>.06 
 
In terms of counterfactual thinking, the largest changes were found for CF2, which was 
the only counterfactual to be fully integrated into both rescripts. Tau-U analyses showed 
that CF2 was the only counterfactual to show significant changes in Distress during 
treatment, which was maintained at follow-up. Similarly, while all 3 counterfactuals 
showed clear changes in Frequency, these were most pronounced for CF2, which 
showed a downward trend across treatment and follow-up following a stable baseline. 
An increase in simulation in Session 2 was not linked to larger reductions in 
counterfactual Frequency or Distress. Although, as noted earlier, lower simulation 
scores in Session 1 were largely due to therapist input, rather than an overall absence 
of coherence. 
 
Participant F. Table PF1 shows PF’s rescript details. PF’s trauma related to a 
physical assault. English was spoken as a first language. PF had experienced multiple 
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traumas as an adult and was experiencing financial difficulties and significant social 
isolation at the time of treatment. PF also lost her job between the times when the 2nd 
and 3rd baseline points were completed. 
 
Table PF1. 
Target Image, Encapsulated Belief, Counterfactual Thoughts and Chosen Rescript for 
PF. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
On the 
ground being 
physically 
and verbally 
assaulted by 
another 
woman.  
‘I am helpless 
and weak.’ 
‘If only someone 
had stopped to help 
me.’ 
 
‘If only I could 
have managed to 
get up and protect 
myself.’ 
 
‘If only someone 
had done something 
to warn me.’ 
PE rescripted the image to 
incorporate a group of 
family members, friends and 
police men to support her 
from the beginning of the 
image. This meant that she 
did not end up on the 
ground. She also made 
herself bigger and the 
perpetrator smaller in the 
image so that she could 
confront her successfully. 
 
Three baseline points were available for PF, followed by one rescripting session and 
one follow-up point. PF was likely to return to this image for further work, however, 
following this initial work, future sessions were to shift focus. There is no treatment 
phase data for Frequency and Interference measures. Due to a series of missed 
appointments, there was a gap of three weeks between the second and third baseline 
points and two weeks between the rescripting and follow-up appointment. All 
Counterfactual Frequency and Distress scores, with the exception of CF3 Frequency, 
showed a significant decline across baseline. Due to limited treatment phase data, Tau-
U analyses were not carried out. Thus, data for these measures must be interpreted with 
caution. 
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One potential source of variability is that PF lost her job in the time between the second 
and third baseline points, which is where some of the biggest changes occur. It is 
possible that, due to this substantial change in life circumstances, PF became more 
preoccupied with other things, thus impacting on the Frequency and Distress of specific 
counterfactuals relating to the trauma incident. Image Intrusiveness, Encapsulated 
Belief and Counterfactual Thought VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures 
PF1-5, Figure PF6 and Figures PF7-12 respectively. GOS and Session Content codes 
are summarised in Table PF2. 
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Figure PF1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-------) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PF3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PF2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PF4. Nowness VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (----) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PF5. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure PF6. Level of Belief VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Figure PF7. CF1-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PF9. CF2-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PF8. CF1-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PF10. CF2-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
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Figure PF11. CF3-Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (-----) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
 
Figure PF12. CF3-Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend 
(ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Table PF2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PF. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
7 2 2 3 1 1 3 0 2 2 2 
 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. PF’s rescript was rated as 
moderately well-simulated. The actual narrative was well-simulated but this was 
largely due to therapist input, resulting in a lower rating across most GOS codes. PF’s 
rescript consisted of mostly new, rescripted imagery and change was introduced 
immediately before the original event. PF pre-empted the attack by incorporating back-
up before encountering her perpetrator. Thus, while she still faced the perpetrator, the 
physical assault/worst moments did not take place. PF did not have difficulty staying 
with the imagery although the rescript was largely guided by the therapist. 
 
Elements associated with the original trauma-image were rated as somewhat vivid, 
while new imagery elements were rated as highly vivid. High levels of prompting were 
needed to enhance imagery activation. PF did not describe any internal processes 
associated with original trauma-imagery but new thoughts (‘I don’t care about what you 
say or do’, ‘She’s not getting to me’) emotions (relief, confidence) and physical 
sensations (standing up straight and firm) were rated as moderately intense. Ratings 
suggested a medium level of cognitive/emotional change regarding the image and that 
most, but not all of the rescript felt believable. 
 
In terms of Image Intrusiveness, the only sustained changes were found for Distress 
which showed a small but clear decrease in scores that was maintained at follow-up. 
Notable decreases were initially seen for Nowness and Uncontrollability, but these were 
not maintained at follow-up. No changes occurred for Frequency or Interference. Initial 
treatment gains were also seen for Level of Belief in the encapsulated belief but, again, 
these disappeared at follow-up. 
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The most notable change in counterfactual thinking was for Frequency of CF3, which 
showed a large decrease at follow-up, following an increasing baseline. Counterfactual 
Distress for both CF1 and CF2, which were incorporated into the rescript, show a clear 
drop to floor levels during treatment. However, both showed a significant decreasing 
baseline trend and increase in scores to baseline levels at follow-up. Particular caution 
is needed across counterfactual results due to baseline instability. Furthermore, lack of 
sustained change in scores more generally may, in part, be due to stressful life events 
and sporadic nature of treatment at the time of this study. 
 
Participant X. PX was part of the Phase 1 sample. Thus, no encapsulated belief 
or counterfactual thoughts were identified.  Table PX1 shows PX’s rescript details. 
Although not his first language, sessions were conducted in English. PX was currently 
seeking asylum in the UK, which was causing high levels of anxiety and preoccupation. 
PX had experienced repeat traumas throughout childhood. 
 
Table PX1. 
Target Image and Chosen Rescript for Participant X. 
Target Image Encapsulated 
Belief 
Counterfactual 
Thoughts 
Rescript 
Being 
physically 
assaulted as a 
child by captor 
for not carrying 
out chores 
properly. 
- - PX returned to trauma scene as 
adult self along with therapist 
and friends from the present. 
Rescript involved seeking 
revenge on perpetrator by 
physically assaulting him, 
comforting past self and taking 
him to safety to live with 
friends from present. 
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Only Image Intrusiveness measures, except Nowness, were administered to PX. Three 
baseline points are available for PX, followed by one session of rescripting and two 
follow-up data points. Due to the fact that measures were only administered once per 
session (before rescripting) there is no treatment phase data available for any of PX’s 
measures. There was a gap of six weeks between the second and third baseline points, 
however, all measures met criteria for baseline stability. There was also a gap of two 
weeks between the treatment session and the first follow-up point. Image Intrusiveness 
VAS scales are graphically displayed in Figures PX1-4. GOS and Session Content 
codes are summarised in Table PX2.
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Figure PX1. Frequency VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ 
xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PX3. Distress VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
 
Figure PX2. Interference VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and trend (ˑ 
ˑ xˑ ˑ). 
Figure PX4. Uncontrollability VAS: raw data (●), central tendency (------) and 
trend (ˑ ˑ xˑ ˑ).
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Table PX2. 
Summary of GOS and Session Content Codes for PX. 
GOS Image 
Departure 
Timing 
of 
Change 
Staying 
with 
Image 
Therapist 
Guidance 
Original 
Imagery 
Activation 
New 
Imagery 
Activation 
Original 
Processes 
New 
Processes 
Cognitive/ 
Emotional 
Shift 
Rescript 
Believability 
5 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 
 
Note: GOS coding ranges from 0-12 and Session Content codes range from 0-3.
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Linking GOS and Session Content codes to outcome. PX’s overall GOS rating 
indicates a low level of simulation and coherence. PX’s session contained more original 
trauma-imagery than new imagery. Change was introduced during the original image 
during the worst moment. PX was able to stay with the imagery during the session, 
although a certain amount of therapist guidance/prompting was necessary in order to 
facilitate more vivid and detailed imagery. 
 
Original trauma-imagery elements were rated as very vivid and intense while new 
imagery was rated as only moderately so. Ratings of original emotions (fear, anger, 
helplessness), thoughts (‘I’d rather die’, ‘I’m nothing’) and sensations (fast heart beat) 
were very high. New emotions (happiness) and thoughts (‘I’m worth something’) from 
rescripted imagery were rated as less intense, although still highly activated. 
Cognitive/emotional shift and level of belief were rated as moderately strong. 
 
Little change in outcome measures occurred. A very small decrease in Distress occurred 
at follow-up. A similar, but less clear change in Frequency was found. Interference and 
Uncontrollability show comparable trends across baseline and follow-up as well as 
phase overlap, suggesting no change with ImRs onset. Caution in interpretation is 
required due to the complete lack of treatment phase data. 
 
Summary of patterns across participants. Patterns of codes and outcome 
measures across cases will now be discussed. Due to the limited number of participants, 
high variability in scores and baseline instability for some participants, these patterns 
are suggested tentatively. Image Intrusiveness and Encapsulated Belief outcomes will 
be discussed first, followed by counterfactual measures. 
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Changes in image intrusiveness and encapsulated belief. Those whose rescripts 
fell in the upper range of simulation ratings tended to experience decreases across most 
IVAS (Frequency, Interference, Distress, Nowness and Uncontrollability) and EBVAS 
(Encapsulated Belief) scales. Decreases ranged from small-large. Small-medium 
changes during treatment tended to be stable and sustained at follow-up. While some 
larger changes seen during treatment were also sustained, others were more variable 
and would often increase at follow-up but still remain below baseline levels. For one 
participant (PA), some IVAS scales increased during treatment before decreasing at 
follow-up. For some of these participants’ GOS ratings increased across sessions. 
Lower GOS ratings usually co-occurred with no change or small, but reliable, changes 
in IVAS and EBVAS scales. However, one such participant (PF), whose poorly-
simulated rescript was further enhanced by therapist prompting, did experience large 
changes at treatment, which subsequently returned to baseline at follow-up. 
 
In terms of Session Content codes, image departure and ability to stay with the image 
did not differ across cases. All were able to stay with the imagery and all but one 
participant included some original but mostly new imagery across sessions.  One 
participant used mostly original trauma-imagery elements and experienced very little 
change. Timing of change did differ across cases. All but one case that introduced 
change during the original image experienced clear decreases in IVAS and EBVAS 
scores. Those who introduced change immediately before the original imagery 
experienced no/small decreases. Therapist guidance also differed across cases. 
Participants who either consistently guided the rescript independently or progressed 
from therapist- to self-guided rescripting tended to experience the clearest decreases in 
IVAS and EBVAS scores, while those who continuously relied on therapist prompting 
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experienced smaller treatment gains. PA was the exception here as she did experience 
larger gains while relying on prompting. However, these gains were not particularly 
stable. 
 
Vividness of original and new imagery elements, when examined in isolation 
(particularly the former), were not very clear. Although, those who showed treatment 
gains tended to have more vivid ratings of new imagery elements than those who 
showed no/small gains. When vividness of original trauma-imagery and new 
rescripted-imagery were taken together, those whose new imagery was rated as more 
vivid than the original imagery, or whose original and new imagery was equally vivid, 
tended to show clearer treatment gains. Only one participant who exhibited this pattern 
did not show gains. All whose original imagery elements were rated as more vivid than 
new imagery, showed no/small gains. 
 
Original and new internal processes showed similar but clearer patterns. Larger and 
more stable treatment gains were experienced by those whose original, trauma-related 
thoughts/feelings/sensations were rated as moderately intense and whose new processes 
were rated as very intense. Some showed a pattern across sessions whereby ratings of 
original processes decreased in intensity while new processes increased. Smaller/no 
treatment gains were experienced by those with less intense ratings of new, rescript-
related processes and original, trauma-related processes that were rated as either 
minimal/absent or very intense. Original processes for these participants tended to be 
rated more intensely than new processes. 
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Both cognitive/emotional shift and rescript believability ratings showed similar patterns 
across participants. Those who exhibited larger and more stable gains were rated as 
experiencing medium to high levels of cognitive/emotional shift in relation to the image 
and as experiencing the rescript as mostly or completely believable. Sometimes this 
involved an increase in ratings for these factors across sessions. Those who experienced 
smaller/no treatment gains had lower ratings of cognitive/emotional shift and belief 
levels. 
 
Changes in counterfactual scores. All but one (PD) generated three dominant 
counterfactuals in relation to the target image. Fourteen of these were upward in nature 
and one was downward. Only one non-referent counterfactual was generated while the 
remaining were split equally between self- and other-referent. Highly variable levels of 
change in counterfactual Distress and Frequency were found within and across 
participants. All participants chose to incorporate at least one of their counterfactuals 
in at least one session. 
 
In terms of GOS, those whose rescripts were less well-simulated (PC and PF) tended to 
experience small or inconsistent changes in counterfactual Frequency and Distress. PB 
and PE, whose rescripts were very well-simulated, tended to experience medium to 
large changes in scores that were more consistent. However, baseline instability 
presents a major issue with interpretation of these findings. Furthermore, PA who also 
produced a well-simulated rescript, experienced small or inconsistent decreases in 
counterfactual outcomes. 
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For some participants, overall decreases in Frequency and Distress were greatest for the 
counterfactual targeted by the rescript. However, this was not consistent. PB showed a 
comparable decrease for all three counterfactuals, all of which were incorporated into 
their rescript. PE’s targeted counterfactual was the only one to show significant 
decreases in Distress and, while all counterfactuals showed a decrease in Frequency, 
this was most pronounced for the targeted counterfactual. PF’s targeted counterfactuals 
also showed the greatest declines in Distress. However, their non-targeted 
counterfactual was the only one to decreases in terms of Frequency. PC’s targeted 
counterfactual was the only one to show continuing decline in Frequency at follow-up, 
but changes in Distress were comparable across counterfactuals. While no overall gains 
in counterfactual Distress were seen for PA, session specific patterns can be seen. 
Session 1, which incorporated no core counterfactuals, showed no change. Session 3, 
which did, showed large decreases in Distress. However, this was comparable for 
targeted and non-targeted counterfactuals. 
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Discussion 
This study employed a SCED design and the use of coding to investigate the underlying 
factors potentially contributing to change in ImRs. There was a particular focus on the 
role of simulation and how this might relate to reductions in image intrusiveness and 
counterfactual thinking as well as increases in meaning. It also aimed to replicate some 
of the findings of Salter’s (2014) study in relation to Session Content codes responsible 
for change. Phase 1 of this study aimed to adapt existing GOS coding schemes for use 
within ImRs and to assess its inter-rater reliability. It also aimed to assess inter-rater 
reliability of the Session Content coding scheme. This was successfully completed and 
inter-rater reliability deemed adequate. Phase 2 then applied these schemes to a series 
of seven cases in order to link codes to outcome. Phase 2 findings will first be discussed 
in relation to each of the hypotheses as well as existing literature. This will be followed 
by considerations of how findings fit with existing theories. Clinical implications, 
strengths/limitations and future research will then be discussed. 
 
Symptom Severity, Image Intrusiveness and Encapsulated Belief 
The first hypothesis predicted that, because ImRs and the simulation heuristic (SH) both 
involve the mental construction of imaginary events that did not happen, higher GOS 
ratings would link to greater reductions in outcome measures following rescripting. 
Group and individual level analyses offer tentative support for this hypothesis. At group 
level, all high-responders produced well-simulated rescripts while low-responders’ 
rescripts were less well-simulated. At an individual level, higher GOS ratings were also 
linked to larger and more stable reductions in frequency, interference, distress, nowness 
and uncontrollability of the intrusive images, as well as in the level of belief of the key 
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meaning, while lower GOS ratings tended to link with smaller or larger, but 
inconsistent, gains. However, these findings remain tentative due to the small sample 
size, observational nature of results and baseline inconsistency for some individual 
analyses. The lack of statistical analyses in particular warrants caution in interpretation. 
 
Role of simulation. These results offer tentative, initial support to the idea that 
effective ImRs may rely, in part, on the level of simulation and coherence of the rescript. 
Previous findings have suggested that GOS predicts subjective probability (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973, 1982) and enhances one’s ability to interpret past events and alter 
their emotional states (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). In terms of Session Content, the 
biggest differences between high- and low-responders at group level were for ratings 
of new processes, with pronounced differences also found for cognitive/emotional shift 
and rescript believability. Similar patterns were found at an individual level for Image 
Intrusiveness. Furthermore, individual analysis showed that those with higher GOS 
scores tended to experience greater reductions in level of belief in the key meaning of 
the intrusive image (although changes were not always stable). Thus, through 
producing a highly-simulated rescript, it may be that high-responders subsequently 
experienced more intense new thoughts, emotions, and sensations, a higher level of 
cognitive/emotional shift and strong levels of belief in the rescript, relative to low-
responders who rescripts were less well-simulated. While this fits with previous GOS 
findings, links between codes were not assessed in the current study, so causality cannot 
be assumed. Whether GOS is responsible for the generation of new thoughts/emotions 
or whether these new processes need to be attended to separately is not clear from the 
current results. 
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Role of cognitions/emotions. Findings in relation to the Session Content 
coding scheme mentioned above replicate findings of Salter (2014) and fit with 
previous suggestions that generation of new mental imagery may facilitate strong 
changes in cognition and emotion (Holmes & Matthews, 2005; Long & Quevillon, 
2009). It is also possible that the intensity of these new processes somehow inhibits 
negative arousal associated with original imagery (Rusch et al., 2000) and makes the 
imagery safer to approach. However, the strength of ImRs is unlikely to rely on the 
production of new processes alone. Otherwise, the generation of unrelated, positive 
imagery should produce symptom reduction. Previous research has shown that ImRs is 
superior to positive imagery techniques in facilitating symptom relief (Hagenaars & 
Arntz, 2012). It has been suggested that, in order to be effective, ImRs must also link 
to the key cognitions and emotions linked with the original event (Wheatley & 
Hackmann, 2011). 
 
While the mean difference in original processes at a group level did not suggest any 
pronounced differences between high- and low-responders, a closer look at individual 
analyses sheds more light in this area. Those who experienced greater changes in 
outcome tended to activate original thoughts/emotions to a moderate-high degree, but 
to a lesser extent than new processes. Again, whether simulation of original material 
automatically facilitates the associated thoughts/emotions was not tested. Similar to 
Salter’s (2014) findings, those who experienced less change in outcome measures 
tended to experience original processes either minimally or very intensely, and 
sometimes to a lesser degree than new processes. These findings fit, to some extent, 
with original PTSD theories (Brewin et al., 1996, 2010; Ehlers & Clark, 2010; Foa et 
al., 1989, 1998) in that a certain amount of exposure to original imagery elements may 
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be necessary to facilitate processing of original material and symptom reduction. 
However, if experienced too strongly, ImRs may not be effective.  
 
Role of vividness. ImRs vividness was encompassed in both coding schemes. 
Thus, as a facet of GOS, it would seem that higher levels of vividness linked to greater 
reductions in outcome. Previous findings suggest that, the more vivid an image is, the 
more likely it is to be recalled (regardless of accuracy) and the more that an image is 
brought to mind, the easier image access becomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Thus, 
perhaps ImRs vividness enhances accessibility and recall. It may also enhance a felt 
sense of believability in the rescript as brain activity for highly vivid, imagined stimuli 
is similar to activity produced by the actual stimulus (Gonsalves et al., 2004). 
 
Original and new imagery activation were also considered separately in the Session 
Content coding scheme. At a group level, there were only small differences between 
high- and low-responders with both groups generating quite vivid new and original 
imagery. A similar range of vividness for each code was seen for both groups. This 
differs from Salter (2014), who found that symptom improvement was less likely if 
original trauma-imagery elements were highly vivid, as participants found it hard to 
stay connected with the imagery. This was not found in the current study, as some 
participants who experienced reduction in scores produced vivid original imagery. 
 
Consideration of image departure, as well as activation/vividness of original and new 
elements in tandem at an individual level, may help to shed some light on these findings. 
Most participants included only a small amount of original imagery and mostly new, 
rescripted imagery. Perhaps a high level of vividness of original traumatic material can 
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be tolerated if it is only for a short duration. This may also enhance the connection to 
the original trauma, consolidating subsequent changes in affect/cognition and linking 
these changes more strongly to the traumatic image in question. Again, these links were 
not specifically tested. Furthermore, while original imagery was vivid for those who 
saw greater reductions in outcome, new imagery tended to be even more vivid. 
 
 Role of therapist guidance. Observations from group-level analysis suggested 
that low-responders required more overall therapist guidance than high-responders, 
who tended to rescript more independently. Individual analyses further contributed to 
these findings by suggesting that clearer decreases in Image Intrusiveness tended to 
occur for those who either consistently guided the rescript independently or progressed 
from therapist- to self-guided rescripting across sessions. Thus, initial therapist 
prompting may sometimes facilitate subsequent independent rescripting and associated 
relief of symptoms. These are similar to findings of Salter (2014) but at odds with those 
of Medin (2015), who found that high-responders’ rescripts relied on therapist guidance 
while low-responders’ rescripts were self-guided. However, these participants only had 
one rescripting session. It is possible that high-responders would have progressed to 
more independent rescripting, as in the current sample, and that the low-responders 
could have benefited from initial therapist guidance. These patterns require further 
research. 
 
In terms of coding for GOS, therapist prompting is currently incorporated within the 
coding scheme in that simulation that relies heavily on therapist input is given a lower 
GOS rating. However, individual analyses showed that some participants who 
ultimately showed a decrease in scores progressed from lower to higher levels of 
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simulation, incorporating elements originally introduced by the therapist. Furthermore, 
one participant, who showed little overall decline in outcome measures but large session 
specific gains, produced a rescript with low simulation ratings. However, it was noted 
that the rescript itself was highly simulated but that scores were lowered by amount of 
therapist input required. This participant only had one session so it was not possible to 
assess subsequent GOS and scores. However, it may be useful to code therapist input 
and GOS of the resultant rescript separately. It may be that higher GOS ratings produce 
change regardless of input, but that independent simulation is ultimately necessary for 
sustained change. However, initial therapist input may help to achieve this. 
 
Staying with imagery and image departure. With regard to remaining codes, 
all participants were able to stay with the imagery in the current study. This has 
previously been linked to greater treatment gains (Salter, 2014). The current study 
neither supports nor contradicts these findings. Perhaps the ability to remain engaged 
with the imagery is necessary but not sufficient for change.  Finally, there is some 
tentative support for previous findings that introducing change during the original 
imagery, rather than immediately beforehand, produces higher level of change in 
outcome measures, offering further support to previous findings (Salter, 2014). 
However, this was not true for all who introduced change during the imagery. 
 
 Summary. The above interpretations of links between codes and outcome 
remain tentative due to small sample size, observational nature of the results and 
baseline instability and phase variability at an individual level. However, a 
hypothesised overview of mechanisms for change in ImRs, based on the current 
findings, could be as follows. Change seems best facilitated when imagery consists of 
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some original, but mostly new imagery that coincides in time with the original traumatic 
event (rather than introducing change beforehand). In addition, emphasis should be 
placed on the level of simulation and coherence of the rescript in question. This 
encompasses elements such as logical and temporal sequencing, minimisation of 
uncertainty, detail and vividness. 
 
Focus on a well-simulated rescript that includes both original and new imagery 
elements may naturally facilitate access to both original and new emotions, thoughts 
and sensation. This, in turn, may facilitate a sense of plausibility/belief in the rescript 
as well as a strong shift in cognition/emotion. Ensuring that only some of the original 
imagery is included may prevent high levels of vividness of original image elements 
and intense original processes from overwhelming people such that they come out of 
the imagery or fail to experience a shift in cognition/affect. In terms of therapist 
guidance, independent rescripting seems ultimately beneficial, although initial therapist 
prompting and guidance may be necessary to reach independent rescripting. 
 
However, as already stated, the results of this study are only truly able to offer tentative, 
initial support for links between individual codes and outcome. Links between codes 
themselves, and whether GOS naturally generates other factors necessary for change 
(such as activation of original/new internal processes) were not assessed in this study 
and the links suggested above remain purely hypothetical in nature. That said, the 
factors themselves show potential links to reductions in the sense of uncontrollability 
and nowness of the image, as well as the associated distress, frequency and interference 
with daily life. A reduction in belief in the encapsulated belief was also seen. No 
comments can be made about PTSD symptom reduction specifically, as it was not 
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assessed in this study. However, it may be that, through the above factors, ImRs reduces 
the intrusiveness and distress of individual images. Over time, rescripting of multiple 
images, and subsequent reductions in intrusiveness and distress, may cumulatively 
facilitate general symptom reduction in PTSD. However, again, this was not tested and 
needs to be assessed in future research. 
 
Counterfactual Thinking 
Hypothesis two predicted that effective rescripting would be linked with more changes 
in counterfactual thinking and that GOS would play a role in this relationship. At a 
group level, high-responders showed some degree of change in counterfactual thinking, 
while low-responders experienced no change or an increase in scores. These results 
were descriptive in nature, rather than statistical, and thus must be considered 
cautiously. However, they offer tentative support for the first part of the hypothesis, 
that effective rescripting links to more changes in counterfactual thinking. 
 
Due to the particularly small sample size for counterfactual data and lack of statistical 
analysis, extreme caution is required in relation to linking GOS to counterfactualising. 
Very tentative support is offered from the group analysis, where highly-simulated 
rescripts linked to change in SRC scores and partially-simulated rescripts linked to no 
change/increases. However, scores were not linked in a linear fashion and these 
findings were descriptive in nature. Support is strengthened by individual-level 
analysis. Those whose rescripts were well-simulated tended to experience medium-
large changes in Frequency and Distress of specific counterfactual thoughts. However, 
this was not true for all well-simulated rescripts. Those with less well-simulated 
rescripts experienced small or inconsistent changes that were often not maintained at 
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follow-up. Baseline instability was a confounding factor, further underlining the 
tentative nature of these conclusions. 
 
Overall, initial, tentative support is shown for the idea that effective ImRs may provide 
an effective means of reducing counterfactual thinking and that this may, in part, rely 
on rescript simulation levels. Findings are also in line with previous findings that 
suggested that repeated simulation of counterfactuals was associated with a decreases 
in their perceived plausibility (DeBrigard et al., 2013). Thus, while simulation may 
enhance one’s sense of belief in the rescript itself, at the same time, it may serve to 
highlight divergent details between the actual event and the content of one’s 
counterfactual thoughts. This may lead to a realisation of the level of change that would 
have been necessary to impact on the actual outcome, thus reducing the distress 
associated with the thoughts and the need for further counterfactualising. 
 
Individual analysis from the current study offers further support for this concept. There 
was some evidence within and across participants that those counterfactuals that were 
specifically targeted and incorporated into the rescripting process showed greater 
declines in Frequency and Distress than non-targeted counterfactuals. This suggests 
that, by targeting specific thoughts, ImRs may provide a way of channelling 
counterfactual thinking in a way that is useful, perhaps conferring some of the usual 
benefits of counterfactual thinking found in the non-clinical population following 
traumatic events (Epstude & Roese, 2008), although this was not specifically tested. 
Causal relations have also been found between counterfactual thinking and an increase 
in meaning whereby reflecting on counterfactuals in relation to an event enhanced 
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event-meaning as well the sense that the event fit more coherently with one’s life 
narrative (Kray, et al., 2010). 
 
 It should be noted that differential gains for targeted counterfactuals were not 
consistent across all cases. It may be that inclusion of one’s core, most distressing 
counterfactuals in relation to the target image may also somehow enhance the overall 
process of counterfactual reduction. This, however was not tested by the current study 
as all participants incorporated at least one of their core counterfactuals at some point. 
Thus, it is not possible to compare these with ImRs that does not target core 
counterfactuals. An alternative explanation for reductions in counterfactuals is also 
possible. Previous research (e.g. Sanna, Chang & Meier, 2001) has shown that negative 
mood predicts upward counterfactual thinking and rumination, while positive mood 
predicts downward counterfactual thinking. Thus, rather than specifically targeting the 
distress associated with counterfactuals, it may be that rescripting simply reduces 
counterfactual thinking by improving overall mood and reducing distress associated 
with the image. However, this would not explain why some counterfactuals reduced 
more than others. It is likely that both processes operate in tandem. 
 
Nevertheless, while tentative, these results have potentially important clinical 
implications given the high levels of distress and shame associated with counterfactual 
thinking in PTSD (Branscombe et al., 2003; Davis et al., 1995; El-Leithy et al., 2006) 
and that fact that high levels of counterfactual thinking styles at the beginning of 
treatment have been found to predict poor treatment response. Furthermore, while 
group analyses focused on self-referent counterfactualising due to the emphasis placed 
on this in the literature (Davis et al, 1995), individual-level analysis yielded an 
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interesting pattern whereby an equal number of self- and other-referent counterfactuals 
were spontaneously generated. All were associated with high levels of distress. Thus, 
future research may want to expand its line of questioning to encompass a broader range 
of counterfactual thinking. In line with previous research (De Brigard et al., 2013), all 
but one of the spontaneously generated thoughts were upward, rather than downward, 
in nature. 
 
Global Meaning 
The third hypothesis, that high-responders would show greater increases in global 
meaning than low-responders and that this would be linked to GOS ratings, was not 
supported by the current results. Firstly, it is important to point out again that the limited 
sample size reduces interpretive power in relation to these results. However, there are 
additional reasons might explain these findings. 
 
The IoC subscale, which measures how well life events have been integrated into one’s 
overall narrative, was chosen as a measure of global meaning. Unlike the SRC scale 
used to measure counterfactual thinking, IoC questions do not pertain to a specific 
event, but to events in general. Thus, it is perhaps understandable that differential 
effects for high- and low-responders were not seen following rescripting of one image 
from one event, given that most participants had experienced multiple and/or repeated 
trauma. Meaningful change in such a measure may be more accessible following ImRs 
in its entirety, across multiple images. Alternatively, it would be useful to devise a 
questionnaire that specifically measures and tracks how well a specific life event is 
integrated into one’s overall life narrative. 
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Results as a whole are not necessarily at odds with existing theories of meaning. 
Theories suggest that discrepancies between global meaning and the specific meaning 
assigned to negative events creates distress (Park & Folkman, 2007, 2010). This 
prompts a process whereby people attempt to reduce this discrepancy either through 
shifting their global beliefs or by changing the event-specific meaning. In the latter 
case, it is possible that, following meaning change of a particular event, it does not 
immediately become integrated into one’s overall life narrative. This is likely to involve 
further, potentially time-consuming processes. Individual analysis discussed earlier 
showed that participants did experience a decrease in the event-specific meaning 
initially assigned to the image in question. However, this decline was not always 
sustained or stable. Thus, in relation to theories of meaning, it is possible that the current 
participants were still in the stage of negotiating the meaning change process for the 
traumatic event and had not yet reached the stage of incorporating this meaning into 
their overall sense of global meaning. 
 
While high- and low-responders could not be differentiated in terms of meaning, it is 
noteworthy that all but one participant did experience an increase in IoC scores, with 
two achieving clinically significant change. One explanation for this is that it simply 
reflects shifts in the meaning making process that are likely to be seen by those in 
therapy. As there was no control group, this possibility cannot be ruled out. It is also 
possible that this measure does not reliably measure global meaning in the current 
sample or that, similar to previous findings where subjective measures of personal 
growth were unrelated to actual growth (Frazier et al., 2009), the subjective rating given 
by participants in the current sample did not reflect actual levels of integration of 
circumstances. 
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Interpretation of the current findings would have been enhanced through the use of 
Jacobson and Traux’s (1991) reliable change index (RCI). Only the cut-off for clinically 
significant change was calculated in the current study as insufficient data was available 
to calculate the RCI. The current sample was heterogeneous in nature and at differing 
stages of treatment. The RCI offers a systematic way of comparing levels of change 
across such participants, regardless of the numerical differences in their follow-up 
scores. The clinical change cut-off is a less reliable means of comparing across 
participants as it concerned with the final numerical score, regardless of how much 
change this represents from the pre-treatment score. That said, given the variable IoC 
scores in the current sample, it is unlikely that RCI scores would have elucidated 
findings/interpretations much further in this particular case. 
 
Theories 
While this study has taken steps towards the question regarding factors necessary to 
produce clinical change in ImRs presented in the Introduction, the current results shed 
little, if any, light on how ImRs impacts on the underlying memory representation. 
Many of the findings would seem to support both the idea of retrieval competition 
(Brewin et al., 2006, 2010) and a change in meaning of the original image (Arntz, 2015; 
Kindt et al., 2007) without differentiating significantly between them. For example, 
GOS has been linked to increased image access (Raune et al., 2005) which could offer 
support for the idea that higher GOS in the current sample enhanced retrieval of the 
new image over the old. However, GOS also facilitates plausibility (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) and, in the current sample, was linked to reduced belief of the key 
meaning of the image. Thus, GOS could have facilitated higher levels of belief and 
connection with new meanings of the rescript, thus supporting the idea of a re-
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evaluation of the US of the original image (Arntz, 2011; Arntz & Weertman, 1999) 
such that the original memory is reconsolidated with a different meaning. Thus, the 
current research can offer some tentative suggestions as to what may be necessary to 
produce clinical change within the ImRs process, as well as offering suggestions as to 
where future research should focus. However, at the level of memory change and 
underlying processes affected by ImRs, little can be said. 
 
Study Strengths 
 Design. One of the major strengths of this study was its use of SCED design. 
While a limited number of studies used this design to look at overall ImRs efficacy (e.g. 
Veale et al., 2015), to our knowledge, only one existing study (Salter, 2014) used SCED 
to explore underlying ImRs processes. Due to the paucity of knowledge regarding 
underlying ImRs mechanisms, SCED designs offer a useful opportunity to explore 
these in depth as they unfold across treatment. While Salter (2014) provided a much 
needed first step, the majority of cases lacked baseline and follow-up data, making it 
difficult to attribute changes in outcome to ImRs factors. A further strength of the 
current study was that all participants had the minimum number of baseline points to 
constitute a phase and at least one follow-up data point. Where possible, baseline 
instability was controlled for. 
 
Furthermore, the current design was relatively successful in isolating the treatment 
component in question (ImRs) without interrupting routine treatment. For most cases, 
where spontaneous rescripting did not occur, stable baselines were achieved for most 
measures, allowing subsequent changes to be linked to the onset of ImRs. Isolating 
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ImRs from other treatment components, such as reliving, is a major challenge within 
PTSD research. 
 
A further design strength was the level of specificity of the continuous measures used. 
Relating VAS scales to the specific image in question, rather than to one’s traumatic 
imagery more generally meant that (a) it was possible to consider a heterogeneous 
group of participants at differing stages of treatment at group level and (b) changes in 
scores could be attributed more specifically to the target intervention. 
 
 Coding. Similar to the use of SCED, coding frameworks further facilitate in-
depth analysis of the underlying processes at work within treatment, allowing research 
to adequately address gaps in knowledge with regard to ImRs. A particular strength of 
the current study was the use of both top-down and bottom-up coding. Using Salter’s 
(2014) Session Content coding scheme encompassed those components of ImRs that 
are readily observable and manifest within sessions. The added use of GOS coding 
enhanced this process by highlighting those factors not so readily observable. Thus, 
coding from these two perspectives allowed the study to encompass a wider range of 
potentially important factors for change in ImRs. This study was also the first to apply 
the GOS Coding scheme to ImRs. 
 
 External Validity. Due to its naturalistic design, the current study did not 
impose any limitations on treatment implementation, either in terms of style or time. 
While some basic ImRs principles exist (Arntz, 2012), there is no single, agreed-upon 
ImRs method. Therapists in the current study implemented ImRs in various ways, and 
the decision as to when ImRs should commence was a clinical judgement, with no 
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relation to study participation. Thus, in so far as was possible, the current study is 
reflective of the type of therapy that one would receive within mental health services. 
 
A further strength was that the sample in this study was quite a heterogeneous group. 
There was a diverse range of cultural backgrounds, age, nature of traumatic event and 
duration of trauma. Participants also varied in terms of the amount of treatment they 
had received (both ImRs and session numbers in general). This, combined with the 
specificity of the measures used, enhances the external validity of the study as 
improvements are less likely to be related to a particular phase in treatment or particular 
demographic factors. 
 
Study Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
 Sample. One of the biggest shortcomings was the limited sample size. Phase 2 
of this study aimed to recruit a minimum of ten participants. The final sample size fell 
short of this. Due to limited participant numbers, the current study lacks power to make 
concrete interpretations. Despite the heterogeneity of the sample, the fact that 
participation numbers were low also increases the possibility that sampling was 
selective. 
 
A number of factors contributed to recruitment difficulties.  Firstly, ImRs is not 
necessarily used routinely in PTSD treatment. Even when ImRs does form part of 
standard practice within services, the current study protocol could not always be applied 
without significant changes to routine treatment (e.g., using isolated sessions of ImRs 
within regular reliving work). Further attempts to broaden recruitment were limited by 
such factors. Secondly, many people with PTSD experience high levels of shame and 
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guilt (Lee, Scragg & Turner, 2001). Given that participation in the study required a 
stranger to listen to recordings of therapy sessions, it is understandable that more people 
did not consent. 
 
A further factor to consider is that, for three participants, English was not their first 
language. While their level of English was deemed good enough to participate in 
therapy without the use of an interpreter, it is generally advised that therapeutic work 
is most effective when carried out in one’s first language as this enables people to 
communicate more fluently (Costa, 2010). This may also have had an impact on session 
coding as these participants did sometimes struggle to describe particular image 
elements and experiences. This was often noticed in the description of emotional or 
cognitive content which were sometimes limited to words such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. 
 
 Design. While effort was made to accurately adhere to SCED protocols, this 
was not always possible given the naturalistic study design. Of particular note were the 
four participants who only received one rescripting session, resulting in an absence of 
treatment phase data for some measures. Gaps between sessions also occurred 
frequently. 
 
Secondly, while all participants had a minimum of three baseline data points, these were 
not always stable. Extending the baseline period in such cases, as suggested by 
Kratochwill and colleagues (2010), would not have been in the best interest of the 
participants. While statistical analyses were used to control for this where possible, in 
those cases with limited/no treatment phase data, this was not possible. This 
significantly reduces the ability to attribute symptom change to rescripting factors as 
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the core of SCED analysis is its reliance on comparing treatment data to a stable 
baseline. Furthermore, the small number of data points available per phase in cases 
where statistical analyses were carried out means that only large effect sizes would have 
been detected. An increased number of data points per phase would have increased the 
power or the Tau-U analysis to detect smaller changes. 
 
While the availability of follow-up data for all participants is a strength, most 
participants only have one follow-up data point. Lack of further data prevented analysis 
of trend and variability beyond treatment. Such information is key to determining 
whether effects extend beyond treatment. Those participants that did have more than 
one follow-up data point varied as to whether scores were maintained, showed further 
decrease (suggesting further benefits beyond treatment) or increased (suggesting that 
effects were not maintained). 
 
Finally, all participants had received some form of reliving prior to their involvement 
in this study. Thus, while the current study was successful in isolating ImRs effects to 
some extent, it is not possible to comment on the efficacy of ImRs as a stand-alone 
treatment. ImRs efficacy as a stand-alone treatment for PTSD has been demonstrated 
previously (Raabe, Ehring, Marquenie, Olff & Kindt, 2015). However, this does not 
preclude the idea that, for the current sample, initial reliving work was necessary in 
order for the mechanisms of action suggested here to be effective. Nor is it possible to 
comment on the most appropriate timing for ImRs to occur. 
 
 Measures.  One potential criticism of the current study is the lack of a disorder 
specific measure (e.g. Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale, Foa, 1995). There were a 
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number of reasons for excluding such measures. Firstly, they are often time consuming 
for participants to complete on a weekly basis. Secondly, most participants had 
experienced multiple, severe traumas and were mid-way through treatment. It was thus 
unlikely that overall symptom scores would reduce significantly following 1-3 sessions 
that focus on one of multiple images. Thirdly, the strength of such standardised 
measures lies in their ability to detect broad clinical changes at a group level. Due to 
the fact that that they are unlikely to change over a short time frame (indeed many 
measures specify that people complete the measures in relation to the past 2 
weeks/month), and are not designed to measure differences in behaviour within an 
individual, they are less appropriate for SCED designs (Morley, 2015b, 2015c). 
Idiographic measures, such as the VASs used here are readily applicable to SCEDS due 
to their ability to capture changes within an individual over short time periods. 
 
However, the VASs used here were still standardised to some extent in that the same 
scales were presented to all participants. Some have argued that measures should be 
further tailored to each individual. Morley (2015c) has suggested that both the criterion 
being measured and the specific scale anchors used ought to be tailored to each 
participant. This was not done in the current study. 
 
 Unaccounted factors. While no study can attend to all potential mechanisms 
of change, there are two in particular that were not addressed in the current study that 
deserve attention. Firstly, no measure of the quality of therapeutic relationship was 
used. Such factors (e.g., warmth, empathy) have often been shown to correlate more 
highly with outcome than specific intervention techniques (Lambert & Barley, 2001). 
Thus, it is possible that changes in scores were dependent on more general factors of 
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therapeutic alliance, or that those factors identified were dependent on the quality of 
the relationship. 
 
Secondly, the extent to which participants practiced rescripting between sessions was 
not measured. This is likely to have an impact on many factors relating to ease of recall 
of the image. However, of particular note for the current study is the potential link 
between practice and ease of simulation. Repeated simulation has been linked to 
increased level of detail and ease of imagining (De Brigard et al., 2013). Thus, daily 
practice of the rescript is likely to have enhanced GOS. Through practicing the rescript, 
participants are also likely to have made further amendments and changes, further 
enhancing GOS ratings of the resulting rescript. 
 
Thus, the ratings given to the rescripts in this study may not fully reflect the actual 
rescripts being rehearsed on a day to day basis by participants. Two additional study 
components would have been useful: (1) a measure of weekly practice and (2) a 
recording of one’s rescript at the end of each week, or at least at the end of rescripting 
for the target image, in order to assess GOS factors of resultant rescripts. 
 
Another possible explaining factor in the current study is number of sessions, 
particularly given that all low-responders only had one rescripting session. However, 
this was also true for PB, who experienced the second highest level of change. 
Treatment duration could also be considered as a contributing factor. PD, who had the 
longest treatment duration, did indeed experience the highest level of symptom change. 
However, beyond this, treatment duration did not seem to predict outcome. Indeed, PC, 
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who experienced the second highest level of treatment, was categorised as a non-
responder. 
 
Future Research 
Current and previous research have provided a starting point by identifying particular 
ImRs factors that seem to link to outcome. These findings will need to be replicated. 
Furthermore, larger scale studies are necessary to disentangle mechanisms of action 
between these factors. For example, both GOS and particular Session Content codes 
showed some links to outcome in the current study. Further work is needed to identify 
whether these contribute independently to outcome, whether factors such as 
emotional/cognitive processes and rescript believability are dependent on GOS or vice-
versa. 
 
There is some preliminary evidence from this study to suggest that targeting key 
counterfactuals in rescripting may reduce their distress and frequency. However, this 
was not true for all participants and was based on a very small sample size. It would be 
useful to investigate this further, by manipulating whether people target key 
counterfactuals and comparing groups. Whether changes in outcome are related to GOS 
should also be explored. Furthermore, evidence from individual analysis suggests that 
participants’ dominant counterfactuals are not necessarily self-referent, suggesting that 
research should not necessarily limit itself to an investigation of self-referent thoughts. 
 
Similarly, associations between ImRs, GOS and meaning need to be further explored. 
One avenue would be to use a more image-specific measure of meaning to explore 
whether rescripting facilitates incorporating a specific event into one’s overall life 
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narrative. Another avenue would be to use the MMM to explore whether rescripting of 
a series of images relates to an overall shift in global meaning. The field would also 
benefit from research on potential links between shift in image specific meaning and its 
impact on global meaning. 
 
The current study offers little insight into the changes happening at level of memory-
change. Further work is needed to test the two competing ideas of retrieval competition 
(Brewin et al., 2006, 2010) and meaning change (Arntz, 2015; Kindt et al., 2007). In 
terms of current methodology, when asking participants to re-rate measures at the end 
of sessions, it was not specified whether they should hold the original image, new image 
or a combination of the two in mind. This was done partially to coincide with routine 
practice. However, it is unclear whether differences between participants was simply a 
reflection of the type of image being held in mind during ratings. Future research should 
test the differences in focusing on different image types. This may also help to shed 
light on whether one or two images are involved in rescripting. 
 
Clinical Implications 
While the current results and interpretation remain tentative, they offer some possible 
suggestions for clinical practice. It may be useful for clinicians to consider clients’ 
rescripts from a simulation perspective. Enhancing factors such as temporal and logical 
sequencing, level of detail and minimisation of uncertainty may enhance ImRs efficacy. 
Internal processes should also be attended to, with a particular emphasis on the strength 
of new cognitions/emotion. Clients’ level of belief in the rescript should also be 
monitored and attempts to increase this should be made. Findings in relation to 
counterfactual thinking are particularly tentative. However, when discussing ways in 
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which to incorporate change into intrusive images, it may be fruitful to explore a client’s 
core counterfactual thoughts in relation to that image for possibilities. 
 
Conclusions 
The first phase of this study successfully adapted a reliable GOS coding scheme for use 
within ImRs in PTSD and established the reliability of an abbreviated version of the 
Session Content coding scheme. Through the use of SCED and both bottom-up and 
top-down coding, Phase 2 provided initial, tentative support for the role of simulation 
in ImRs efficacy. This is the first study to apply GOS coding to ImRs. Phase 2 also 
replicated previous findings that point to the importance of original and new processes, 
shift in cognition/emotion, rescript believability and level of therapist guidance as 
factors that produce change in ImRs. Image activation (vividness), the amount of 
original/new imagery and the point at which change is introduced within the imagery 
were also highlighted as potential factors for change, although to a lesser degree than 
those already mentioned. Hypothetical links between these factors have been suggested, 
although further research is required to investigate these. 
 
Phase 2 also offers initial support for the idea that one of the ways in which ImRs effects 
change is through a reduction in counterfactual thinking (and associated distress), and 
that higher levels of GOS may facilitate this relationship. Some tentative evidence also 
suggests that specifically targeting core counterfactual beliefs within the rescript may 
be beneficial. Findings relating to links between ImRs and global meaning are unclear 
because, while many participants experienced an increase in global meaning following 
rescripting, there seemed to be no differences between those for whom rescripting was 
and was not effective. 
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These results offer some useful insights into which factors may be necessary to produce 
clinical changing in ImRs. However, findings remain tentative due to the observational 
nature of results, the small sample size and the variability and baseline instability 
observed for some individual cases. Future research will be necessary both to 
substantiate the current findings and to further investigate the causal mechanisms 
hypothesised in this discussion. 
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Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
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Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
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Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK.  
  
After ethical review  
  
Reporting requirements  
  
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
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Details: 
View the form click here   Revise the form click here 
   
Applicant Name: Kathy Looney 
   
Application title: 
What makes a good imagery rescript: Using verbal analysis to 
investigate the characteristics required to make a successful 
rescript in a clinical samp 
   
Comments: Approved 
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Appendix 6. South West London and St George’s Research and Development 
Substantial Amendment Approval (A)
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Appendix 7. South West London and St George’s Research and Development 
Substantial Amendment Approval (B) 
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Appendix 8. Homerton University Hospital Research and Development Approval
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Appendix 9. Goodness of Simulation (GOS) Coding Scheme 
Each of the following six cretieria are rated on a scale of 1-3 where 3=Mostly True (clearly there), 2=Partially True (a little bit) and 1=Not True or Mostly 
Not True. 
 
Therapist Prompts: Think about whether or not they were filling in essential vs extra detail. Former ought to be taken into consideration while the 
latter should not. Prompts that reflect general therapeutic support should not impact ratings. 
 
Keep in mind: To what extent does the narrator have, in their mind, a coherent simulation that feels believable, like it could/could have happened. 
 
Criterion Details of what you are looking for in the rescript Rating 
Logically Sequenced 
Extent to which successive elements of a 
scenario are connected logically, with each 
step following from the previous one. 
Logical gap/jump indicated when two adjacent statements do not logically connect. 
 
Transitions within scenario do not have to be physically possible, but should make logical sense within the 
context of the rescript. 
 
Temporally Ordered 
Extent to which there is a sense of temporal 
flow, with the scenario unfolding over time. 
Temporal ordering can be communicated explicitly or clearly implied so that sense of temporal flow is 
established. 
 
The emphasis is on the presence of a clear sense that the elements of the scenario are ordered in time and 
that the narrator knows what happens and when so that their description unfolds in a smooth and ordered 
manner.  
 
Score lower if there the rescript jumps back and forth in time or response mainly focus on 
thought rather than progress of events over time. 
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Uncertainty is Minimised 
Extent to which scenario either increases or 
decreases a sense of uncertainty about 
what is being described. 
Extent to which the narrator adequately addresses (i) inherently uncertain aspects of the rescript 
OR (ii) uncertain elements introduced by the narrator themselves. 
 
Direct expressions of the narrator’s own uncertainty should also be taken into account. 
 
Note: Relates to uncertainty from the narrator’s point of view – if it is apparent that elements are 
clear in the mind of the narrator even if not to the rater, this should not impact rating given. 
 
Good Level of Detail 
Extent to which scenario gives a 
comprehensive account of all the basic 
elements of the situation. 
Extent to which the narrator provides details necessary for following the scenario. 
 
Score lower when enough detail is omitted/unspecific such that substantial portions of the scenario need 
to be inferred. 
 
Easy to Imagine 
Extent to which scenario is vividly described 
and easy to imagine. 
Extent to which imagery description can be easily pictured/imagined in the mind of the rater. 
 
Assesses how clear and detailed the rescript is. 
 
Flows Smoothly 
Subjective, global judgement of how well 
the scenario flows. 
Extent to which rater has to work to make the story ‘fit’ in their mind and the degree to which they must 
make inferences. 
 
Assesses how halting and tentative the rescript is. 
 
Note: Does not include individual habits or ways of talking (e.g. ‘you know’). 
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Appendix 10. Session Content Coding Scheme 
 Departure from the original imagery 
Summary: This item rates the extent to which the rescript departs from the original imagery in terms of the amount of new material 
being introduced. Consider the setting and time taken up by the new imagery. 
 
3 =  All new: All new (e.g., safe place imagery);  
 
Additional guidance: none of the original imagery is included in the rescript. 
 
     2 =  Mostly new: Mostly new imagery, some old material;. 
 
Additional guidance: a small portion of the original intrusive imagery is incorporated into the rescript. 
 
1 =  Some new: the majority of the imagery is taken up with the original  
intrusive imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Less than half of the imagery incorporates new material,  
0 =  Mostly old/no change: Mostly old imagery or no change from original intrusive imagery (e.g., reliving only);  
 
Additional guidance: a minimal amount of new material is incorporated
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 Timing of change 
Summary: This item rates the point in time when new information is introduced into the imagery. 
 
3 =  During the imagery: The rescript coincides in time with the original imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Change in the imagery is introduced part way through the original imagery –. . 
 
2 =  Immediately (1) before OR (2) after the imagery: The rescript occurs immediately before or in the aftermath of the original 
imagery (specify before or after). 
 
Additional guidance: Change in the imagery is introduced immediately before or at the end of events in the original imagery (i.e., one 
follows consecutively after the other). For example, events in the new imagery pre-empt events in the original imagery or build on the 
ending of the original imagery. 
 
1 =  Some time (1) before or (2) after the imagery: The rescript occurs a while before or after the original imagery (specify before  
or after). 
 
Additional guidance: A new imagery is created that, if real, would have occurred some length of time before or after the original 
imagery (i.e., one does not follow consecutively after the other) but the temporal link is clear. For example, the new imagery changes 
the story of the original imagery by adding new content at an earlier or later point in time (e.g., days, weeks or years earlier or 
later). 
 
0 =  No temporal relationship to the imagery: The rescript occurs at a time that appears unrelated to the original imagery or the 
temporal relationship between original and new imagery is not apparent. 
 
Additional guidance: New imagery is created that, if real, would have occurred at a time that is unrelated to the original imagery - 
the temporal link is not clear. The new imagery is thus not part of the original imagery
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 Ability to stay with the imagery 
Summary: This item rates the client’s ability to continuously activate and stay with the imagery throughout the rescripting process. 
 
3 =  Mostly stays with: The client stays with the imagery throughout. 
 
Additional guidance: The client for the most part is able to bring to mind and stay with the imagery through the entire rescripting 
session. 
 
2 = Stays with moderately: The client stays with the imagery but falls short of doing so for the entire session. 
 
Additional guidance: The client is able to bring to mind and stay with the imagery for the majority of the rescripting session, but 
comes out of the imagery at times (). 
 
1 = Stays with somewhat: The client struggles to stay with the imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Although the client is able to bring to mind and stay with the imagery at times, he/she frequently come back to 
the therapy room. 
 
0 = Stays with minimally/not at all: The client cannot stay with imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: The client is unable to bring the imagery to mind for most of the session.
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 Amount of guidance given by the therapist 
Summary: This item rates the client’s ability to follow the rescripting process and incorporate changes in the imagery without 
significant guidance from the therapist. 
 
3 =  Mostly self-guided: Little guidance from therapist is needed; the client is able to incorporate change into the imagery and guide 
themselves through the rescript with little or no prompting. 
 
Additional guidance: The client is able to bring to mind and describe the rescripted imagery with little input from the therapist. For 
example, the therapist provides infrequent minor/general prompts to capture more details or to bring in additional changes. 
 
2 = Moderately self-guided: Some guidance from therapist is provided; the client and therapist guide the rescript equally. 
 
Additional guidance: The client is able to follow therapist prompts in order to bring to mind and vividly describe the rescripted 
imagery. Without these prompts, it is likely that the client would leave out details or become stuck. 
 
1 = Somewhat self-guided: The rescript is mostly guided by the therapist; the client struggles to guide the rescript. 
 
Additional guidance: Rescripting is mostly guided by the therapist; the client finds it difficult to describe the imagery and to 
incorporate change. For example, the therapist provides frequent specific prompts to capture more details or to bring in additional 
changes. 
 
0 = Minimally/not at all self-guided: The rescript is mostly/completely guided by the therapist. 
 
Additional guidance: The client is reliant on the therapist for guiding the rescript. It is necessary for the therapist to become actively 
involved in the description of the event and to ensure changes to the imagery are incorporated
193 
 
 Activation of imagery – original imagery elements 
Summary: This item rates the client’s ability to visualise the imagery as indicated by the vividness of their description. 
 
3 =  Mostly able: The client can see the imagery easily in the mind’s eye; the imagery is very vivid (“I can see, hear, smell, feel and/or 
taste it very clearly”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery that is very clear and intense for the majority of the session. All or most of the 
imagery is experienced in great detail. The imagery is mostly or entirely described in present tense and first person. 
 
2 = Moderately able: Parts of the imagery can be seen easily in the mind’s eye; most of the imagery is vivid (“Mostly all of the details 
are there”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery where parts are clear and intense, while other parts are lacking in clarity. Both 
present and past tense, and first and third person may be used. 
 
1 = Somewhat able: Some of the imagery can be seen easily in the mind’s eye; some parts of the imagery are vivid (“Some of the details 
are there”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery where many parts are lacking in clarity. The imagery may be mostly described in 
third person but first person may also be used. 
 
0 = Minimal/not at all able: Very little or none of the imagery can be seen clearly in the mind’s eye; the imagery is not vivid 
(“Everything is a bit blurred”). 
 
Additional guidance: Client is not able to bring to mind imagery that is clear. The imagery is not likely to be described in present 
tense and first person
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 Activation of imagery – new imagery elements 
Summary: This item rates the client’s ability to visualise the imagery as indicated by the vividness of their description. 
 
3 =  Mostly able: The client can see the imagery easily in the mind’s eye; the imagery is very vivid (“I can see, hear, smell, feel and/or 
taste it very clearly”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery that is very clear and intense for the majority of the session. All or most of the 
imagery is experienced in great detail. The imagery is mostly or entirely described in present tense and first person. 
 
2 = Moderately able: Parts of the imagery can be seen easily in the mind’s eye; most of the imagery is vivid (“Mostly all of the details 
are there”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery where parts are clear and intense, while other parts are lacking in clarity. Both 
present and past tense, and first and third person may be used. 
 
1 = Somewhat able: Some of the imagery can be seen easily in the mind’s eye; some parts of the imagery are vivid (“Some of the details 
are there”). 
 
Additional guidance: The client creates imagery where many parts are lacking in clarity. The imagery may be mostly described in 
third person but first person may also be used. 
 
0 = Minimal/not at all able: Very little or none of the imagery can be seen clearly in the mind’s eye; the imagery is not vivid 
(“Everything is a bit blurred”). 
 
Additional guidance: Client is not able to bring to mind imagery that is clear. The imagery is not likely to be described in present 
tense and first person
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 Activation of original internal processes 
Summary: This item rates activation of emotions, cognitions and/or physical sensations associated with the original imagery. 
 
3 =  Very high activation: Most or all trauma-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions are present in the session. 
Processes are very intense. 
 
Additional guidance: The client experiences very intensely exactly how they felt emotionally or physically or what they thought at the 
time of the original event.  
 
 
2 = High activation: A high amount of trauma-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions are present during the session. 
Processes are intense. 
 
Additional guidance: Trauma-related internal experiences are experienced intensely. Select this option if the client reports or 
appears to be experiencing these internal processes in the session (e.g., more than 50% if the client were asked to rate the intensity). 
 
1 = Moderate/low activation: A moderate or low amount of trauma-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions are present 
during the session. Processes are moderately intense. 
 
Additional guidance: Trauma-related internal experiences are present in the description of how the client feels but are experienced at 
a moderate or low level (e.g., less than 50% if the client were asked to rate the intensity). 
 
0 = Minimal/no activation: Trauma-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions are minimal/absent during the session. 
Processes are of very low intensity. 
 
Additional guidance: The client does not access trauma-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions during the session. 
It may be that the client does not express these internal experiences, or that the client reports how he/she felt/thought at the time but 
does not feel/think that way now in the therapy room.
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 Activation of new internal processes 
Summary: This item rates activation of emotions, cognitions and/or physical sensations associated with change in the imagery. 
 
3 =  Very high activation: New emotions, cognitions and/or physiological sensations are present and very intense during the rescripted 
part of the imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Change-related internal processes are experienced very intensely. . 
 
2 = High activation: New emotions, cognitions and/or physiological sensations are present and intense during the rescripted part of the 
imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Change-related internal experiences are experienced intensely. Select this option if the client reports or 
appears to be experiencing these internal processes but at less than full intensity. 
 
1 = Moderate/low activation: New emotions, cognitions and/or physiological sensations are present but of moderate/low intensity 
during the rescripted part of the imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: Change-related internal experiences are present in the description of how the client feels, but are experienced 
at a moderate or low level. 
 
0 = Minimal/no activation: New emotions, cognitions and/or physiological sensations are not accessed during the rescripted part of the 
imagery. 
 
Additional guidance: The client does not access change-related thoughts, feelings and/or physiological reactions during the session. 
Either they are completely absent, or the client can hypothetically describe how he/she might feel/think but does not experience them 
directly from the rescript.
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 Cognitive and emotional shift  
Summary: This item rates the extent to which the meaning (as indicated by expressed thoughts and/or feelings) associated with the 
original imagery changes during the rescripting process. 
 
3 =  High change: The client thinks and/or feels markedly differently towards the original imagery at the end of the session. It is clear a 
shift has taken place. 
 
Additional guidance: Rescripting has produced a high degree of cognitive and/or emotional change. 
 
2 = Medium change: The client thinks and/or feels distinctly differently towards the original imagery at the end of the session.  It is 
likely a shift has taken place. 
 
Additional guidance: Rescripting has produced a moderate degree of cognitive and/or emotional change. 
 
1 = Some change: The client thinks and/or feels somewhat differently towards the original imagery at the end of the session.  It is unclear 
whether a shift has taken place.   
 
Additional guidance: Rescripting has produced a low degree of cognitive and/or emotional change. 
 
0 = Minimal/No change: The client thinks and/or feels the same towards the original imagery at the end of the session. 
 
Additional guidance: Rescripting has produced no cognitive and/or emotional change.
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 Believability of rescript 
Summary: This item rates the extent to which the rescript feels believable and compelling to the client regardless of whether it is 
physically possible.  
 
3 =  Completely believable: The rescript feels completely believable. 
 
Additional guidance: The client describes the new outcome as feeling believable and something they can connect with.  
 
2 = Mostly believable: The client cannot connect with some aspects of the rescript. 
 
Additional guidance: The client describes the new outcome as feeling mostly believable but may not be able to connect with some 
aspects.  
 
1 = Somewhat believable: The rescript mostly does not feel believable but the client can connect with some aspects. 
 
Additional guidance: The client mostly does not feel that the new outcome is believable.  
 
0 = Minimally/Not at all believable: The rescript seems alien and the client cannot connect with it. 
 
Additional guidance: The client does not feel that the new outcome is believable. 
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Appendix 11. Image Intrusiveness Visual Analogue Scales (IVAS) 
 
1. Over the past 3 days, how frequently have you experienced this image or 
memory? 
 
 
2. Over the past 3 days, how much ahs the image or memory interfered with 
your daily life? 
 
 
 
3. At the moment, how distressing is your intrusive image or memory? 
 
 
 
4. At the moment, how uncontrollable is your intrusive image or memory? 
 
 
 
5. At the moment, how much does it feel as if this image/memory is 
happening in the here and now? 
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Appendix 12. Encapsulated Belief Visual Analogue Scales (EBVAS) 
 
Key Meaning:  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
How much do you believe this/these statement(s) to be true right now? 
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Appendix 13. Counterfactual Thought Visual Analogue Scales (CTVAS) 
1. 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into your mind? 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how distressing has this thought been/how upset does it make 
you feel? 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into your mind? 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how distressing has this thought been/how upset does it make 
you feel? 
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3. 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into your mind? 
 
 
In the past 3 days, how distressing has this thought been/how upset does it make 
you feel? 
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Appendix 14. Measure of Mundane Meaning (MMM) – Integration of 
Circumstances subscale (IoC) 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Below is a list of statements that someone might make about 
themselves and their life experiences.  Please read each statement and decide how 
true the statement is of you right now.   Then, choose a response corresponding to 
how true the statement is of you.  Try not to think too much about each item--people 
are different, so there is no best answer. 
 
 
 
 NOT AT ALL TRUE 
OF ME 
 COMPLETELY 
TRUE OF ME 
1. I have been able to find benefit 
from even my negative experiences. 
     0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
2. I have been able to fit all my life 
experiences into my life story. 
     0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
3. I have been able to make sense of 
difficulties that I have experienced in 
my life. 
     0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
4. I have come to terms with events 
that have happened to me in my life. 
     0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
5. I have been able to put the past 
behind me and move on in my daily 
life. 
     0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
 
EXAMPLE 
NOT AT ALL TRUE 
OF ME 
 COMPLETELY 
TRUE OF ME 
You can’t always get what you 
want in life. 
 
        0        20        40        50        60     80        100 
In the example, the number “80” has been circled, indicating that the statement is 
very true of the person responding, but not completely true. 
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Appendix 15. Counterfactual Thinking for Negative Events Scale – Self Referent 
Subscale (SRC) 
Please think of the distressing intrusive image or memory that you identified with your 
therapist. Take a few moments to vividly recall that experience and what it was like for you. 
 
Now, think about the types of thoughts that you experience in relation to this undesirable 
event. Using the following scale, rate the frequency with which you have experienced the 
thoughts described below in the past week. 
 
Scale: 
1=Never 2=Rarely 3=Sometimes  4=Often 5=Very Often 
 
 
 
Thought Rating 
I think about how much better things would have been if I had acted differently  
I wish I had a time machine so I could just take back something I said or did.  
If only I had listened to my friends and/or family, things would have turned out 
better. 
 
I think about how much better things could have been if I had not failed to take 
action. 
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Appendix 16. Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
REC number: 13/NW/0432 
 
Dear Potential Participant, 
I am a trainee studying for a Clinical Psychology Doctorate at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. For my thesis, I am conducting a research project in which I 
would like to invite you to participate.  
You should only participate if you wish to do so; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way or alter your current care.  
Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.  
Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
WHY? 
You have been invited to participate in this research project as you are currently 
receiving therapy for trauma. One of the ways your therapist may work with you to 
overcome your difficulties is through the use of imagery. This technique has been 
shown to be an effective treatment method. However, more research is required to 
find out exactly how it works. It is important for psychologists to gain this deeper 
understanding in order for the technique to progress and for the health service to 
provide even more effective treatment for people who have experienced trauma. This 
study will therefore attempt to look in greater detail at what exactly makes using 
imagery work in therapy effective.  
HOW? 
You will be asked to complete some questionnaires, which will ask you about your 
current mood, and any distressing images that you might experience. These will be 
completed on a number of occasions, before starting your course of treatment, 
before your treatment sessions and, possibly, one week after finishing treatment.  
The study will involve your therapist recording at least one and at most three of your 
therapy sessions that included imagery work. You will always be informed if the 
therapist would like to record the session, and can chose to decline if you wish. This 
data will be kept strictly confidential. To ensure this, recordings will be password 
protected and stored on a password protected computer. Participant numbers will be 
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used instead of names. This way information given cannot be linked back to you. No 
one other than the researcher will have access to the data collected. Recordings will 
be destroyed after 5 years. 
I will also need to access your records held by your therapist during the course of the 
study. This is so that I can collect information such as how many treatment sessions 
you have had, your gender and the type of traumatic event that you have 
experienced. I will NOT take a record of your name, date of birth, address or any 
other information that may make you identifiable. All the information that I do collect 
will be stored in password-protected computer files that only I have access to. 
Potential disadvantages and/or advantages to taking part in this research 
Completing these questionnaires may be tiring. In addition, some questions which 
ask you to think about your mood and other symptoms may stir up upsetting 
thoughts. If this is the case, please feel free to stop the questionnaires and speak to 
your clinician. However, by completing the questionnaires, it may be nice for you to 
see any change that might have occurred over the week. Also, on a wider level, 
taking part in this research may further improve this type of therapy and benefit 
people in the future who are experiencing similar difficulties to you 
Other information 
I would like to be able to contact your GP to let them know that you will be 
participating in the study.   
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. You may also withdraw your data after participation 
from the study up until submission of the final report (June 2016). Leaving the study 
and/or withdrawing the data will have no negative consequences. You may ask 
questions at any point before, during or after the study. 
 
The researcher can be contacted using the following e-mail address: 
Kathy Looney – Kathy.Looney.2013@rhul.live.ac.uk 
 
Or, leave a message on my answer machine on the number below with your name 
and contact number, and I will return your call as soon as possible: 01784 414 012. 
Please also state that the message is for me, Kathy Looney, as the line is used by 
more than one researcher. 
 
Thank you for your time, 
Kathy  
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Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. 
Title of Study: What makes a good imagery rescript: Using verbal analysis to investigate the 
characteristics required to make a successful rescript in a clinical sample. 
College Research Ethics Committee Ref: 2015/089 
Thank you for considering this research project. The person organising the research must explain 
the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the 
Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide 
whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time. 
 I understand that if I decide at any other time during the research that I no longer wish to 
participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it 
immediately. 
 I agree for the researchers to access my medical notes 
 
 I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study,.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 
 
 I understand that relevant, sections of my medical notes and data collected during the study, 
may be looked at by individuals from Royal Holloway University, from regulatory authorities or 
from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research.  I give permission 
for these individuals to have access to my records. 
 
 I do/do not (please delete as appropriate) give consent for the researchers to alert my General 
Practitioner (GP) to my involvement in this study. 
Participant’s Statement: I_______________________________________ agree that the 
research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction. I agree to take part in 
the study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project, 
and understand what the research study involves. 
Signed      Date 
 
Therapist’s Statement: I _____________________________confirm that I have carefully 
explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed 
research to the volunteer. 
 
Signed      Date 
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Appendix 17. Extract from Participant Folders 
Imagery Rescripting Session 1  DATE: ____________ 
 
Collect the Questionnaires and Between Session Visual Analogue scales and 
tick when completed. These can be put in the clear plastic pocket provided at the front 
of this session section. 
 
1. Measure of Mundane Meaning 
2. Counterfactual Thinking of Negative Events Scale 
3. Visual Analogue Scales 
 
  Start audio recording session 
 
A:  Introducing Measures before rescripting starts: 
  Before we start working on the image today, I would like to go 
through the questions about your memory, its impact, meaning and 
associated thoughts that we wrote down during our previous session. 
Then we will do some work with the image/memory.  
Afterwards, I will ask you to re-rate some of these questions to see if 
there has been any change.  
We will do this each week while we are working on this memory, up to 
a maximum of three weeks, so that we can see how things progress over 
time. Do you have any questions? 
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 Give the participant a copy of the Visual Analogue scales (second Red tab - towards 
the back of the folder) to hold and refer to as needed. 
   Here is a copy of the questions that I will be asking you. You can 
refer to it as we go through them if you want to. 
 
B:  Image related Visual Analogue Scales Administration - last 3 days: 
   I would like you to think about the image that we have chosen to 
work on and answer the following questions in relation to that image. I 
will read the summary that we wrote down during the first week and I 
would like you to bring it to mind now: 
 
Read the following Image Summary aloud (taken from previous week): 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
For each question below, read the question aloud and mark their response on 
the scale provided. 
1.   Over the past 3 days, how frequently have you experienced 
this image or memory?  
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2.   Over the past 3 days, how much has the image or memory 
interfered with your daily life?  
 
 
C:  Key Meaning: 
Read the Key Meaning aloud, then read the question and mark the 
participant’s response on the scale provided. 
 
  Now we will rate the ‘Key Meaning’ of your image that we 
identified previously. The key meaning that you identified is: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 I would like you to close your eyes and try to get a clear picture 
of the traumatic image in your mind, as if it is happening in the here 
and now. 
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How true does this key meaning feel right at this moment? Please rate 
how true it feels on a scale from 0-100 where 0 is ‘Not at all true’ and 
100 is ‘Extremely true’. 
 
 
 
D: Visual Analogue Scales - right now 
 
 Keep that image in mind, I am going to ask you a few more 
questions. 
 
Read through the following questions and mark the participant’s responses 
on the scales provided.  Give them copies of the visual analogue scales to refer to 
(Red Tab). 
1.  At this moment, how distressing is the image or memory?  
 
 
 
2.  At this moment, how much does it feel as if this 
image/memory is happening “right here and now”?  
212 
 
 
 
 
3. At this moment, how uncontrollable dos the image or 
memory feel? 
 
 
E:  Counterfactual Thought Visual Analogue Scale administration: 
  Last week, we also identified some of the main thoughts that you 
have in relation to your image, about how the traumatic event might 
have turned out differently.  
So, bringing that image to mind again now, I am going to read out the 
thoughts that we identified and ask you two questions about each one. 
 
 If you have not done so already, insert the counterfactual thoughts identified 
in the first session.  Read out each thought below in turn and ask the accompanying 
questions. Allow them to refer to copies of the scales (Red Tab) 
1.  
 
213 
 
  In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into 
your mind?  
 
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
 
 
 
2.  
 
  In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into 
your mind?  
 
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
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3.  
 
  In the past 3 days, how frequently has this thought come into 
your mind?  
 
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
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CARRY OUT IMAGERY RESCRIPTING 
ON THE CHOSEN IMAGE 
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After Imagery Rescripting on the chosen image 
  Now that we have done some rescripting, I would like to go 
through some of the questions again and re-rate them. 
 
F:  Key Meaning - After: 
 Let’s start by re-rating the ‘Key Meaning’. Close your eyes if you’d 
like, and get a clear picture of your image. 
 
Read the Key Meaning aloud, then read the question and mark the 
participant’s response on the scale provided. 
 The key meaning that you identified is: 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 How true does this key meaning feel now,  on a scale from 0-100 
where 0 is ‘Not at all true’ and 100 is ‘Extremely true’. 
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G: Visual Analogue Scales - After 
 
 Keep that image in mind, I am going to ask you a few more 
questions  
 
Read through the following questions and mark the participant’s responses 
on the scales provided. 
1.  How distressing is the image or memory now?  
 
 
2.  How much does it feel as if this image/memory is happening 
“right here and now”?  
 
 
 
3.  How uncontrollable does the image or memory feel now? 
 
 
H: Counterfactual Thought Visual Analogue Scale - After 
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 I am now going to read out the key thoughts that we identified. 
Keeping your image in mind again, please answer the following questions. 
Read out each thought below (taken from previous session) and ask the 
accompanying question. 
1.  
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
 
 
 
2.  
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
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3.  
 
  At this moment, how distressing is this thought/how upset does 
it make you feel?  
 
 
 
 Stop audio recording session 
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Appendix 18. Participant Debrief Form 
 
 
What makes a good re-script?  
Identifying important factors for re-script efficacy 
 
Post-Participation Information Sheet 
 
Thank you for allowing me to record and listen to your imagery re-scripting session(s). 
Below is a description of the background, purpose and potential implications of this 
research project. 
 
Numerous studies have found that Imagery Re-scripting (ImRs) can be an effective 
treatment for a range of mental health problems, including depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, little is understood about the reasons why 
ImRs is effective or how it works.  
 
A number of researchers have suggested various factors that might increase the 
efficacy of ImRs. Vividness of the image, believability, image coherence and the 
emotions elicited by the image have all been suggested as potential important factors, 
to name but a few. Currently however, few studies have tried to systematically 
understand the factors involved in ImRs. 
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This research aims to use real ImRs sessions to identify factors that may be key in 
promoting re-script efficacy. It is hoped that by doing so, ImRs can continue to develop, 
so that future clients undergoing ImRs can receive the most effective treatment 
possible.  
 
Further information and contact details 
If you would like to receive a copy of the final report or have any questions or comments, 
please email Kathy Looney at the address below. 
 
Researcher: 
Kathy Looney 
 
Clinical Psychology Department  
Royal Holloway  
University of London  
Egham 
Surrey 
TW20 0EX 
 
Email:  Kathy.Looney.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk 
  
 
Research Supervisor: 
Dr Gary Brown 
 
Clinical Psychology Department  
Royal Holloway  
University of London  
Egham 
Surrey 
TW20 0EX 
 
Email: gary.brown@rhul.ac.uk  
Tel: 01784 414 012 
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Appendix 19. PA: Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS, EBVAS and 
CTVAS 
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Appendix 20. PB’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS, EBVAS and 
CTVAS 
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Appendix 21. PC’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS, EBVAS and 
CTVAS 
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Appendix 22. PD’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS and EBVAS 
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Appendix 23. PE’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS, EBVAS and 
CTVAS 
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Appendix 24. PF’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS, EBVAS and 
CTVAS 
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Appendix 25. PX’s Variability Analysis (Trended Range) IVAS 
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